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CRIMINAL LAW
REFORMING INCOMPETENCY TO STAND
TRIAL AND PLEAD GUILTY: A RESTATED
PROPOSAL AND A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR BONNIE
BRUCE J. WINICK*

I.

INTRODUCrION

In the past several years, the Supreme Court has given increasing
attention to the often misunderstood area of the law dealing with the
competency of criminal defendants to stand trial and plead guilty.' As
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I appreciate the helpful comments of David Wexler, Richard Bonnie, and Michael Perlin on an earlier draft of the
manuscript and the research assistance of Katherine Diamandis and Douglas Stransky.
1 1 Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993) (rejecting contention that courts should
apply a higher standard of incompetency for determining competency to plead guilty than
for determining competency to stand trial); Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992)
(reversing a conviction where the defendant was forced to stand trial while on a high dose
of antipsychotic medication to which he had objected); Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct.
2572 (1992) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute creating a presumption in
favor of competency and placing the burden of proving incompetency on the party raising
the issue); see also Perry v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990) (remanding 494 U.S. 210
(1990)) (avoiding decision concerning whether state could impose unwanted psychotropic
medication to restore a death row inmate found incompetent to competency, so that the
state could execute him); Ford v. Wainwright, 472 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that state
could not execute an incompetent death row inmate). Prior to this recent activity in the
incompetency-to-stand-trial area, the Court had considered criminal competency issues in
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (analyzing when due process requires a determination of competency); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (analyzing constitutional
limits on the states' authority to hospitalize defendants based on their incompetency to
stand trial); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (discussing when due process requires a
determination of competency); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (standard for
determining competency to stand trial).
Under the incompetency doctrine, if at any time in the criminal proceedings defendants appear mentally ill, the issue of their competency to proceed may be raised. This may
occur when the defendant seeks to plead guilty or to stand trial. It may occur when the
defendant seeks to waive certain constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel or to a
jury trial. Even after conviction, the issue may be raised at a sentencing hearing, or when
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a court dealing exclusively with cases and controversies, the Supreme
Court has addressed these issues in the usual piecemeal fashion.
Although it has considered such issues as the standard of competency
that courts should apply,2 the procedures for its determination, 3 and
4
the use of psychotropic medication in maintaining competency, it
has not examined the premises underlying the incompetency doctrine
or the need for broad reform in this area.
The incompetency doctrine exists primarily to protect criminal
defendants who are severely impaired by mental illness. Yet, existing
practices are costly, burdensome to defendants, and, therefore, often
inconsistent with the doctrine's stated objectives. Thus, substantial reforms are needed.

Ten years ago I proposed a radical restructuring of the incompetency doctrine. 5 This Article reviews that proposal and refines and
expands the thesis. It also responds to recent criticisms of the initial

proposal made by Professor Richard Bonnie. 6 In addition, it comments on Professor Bonnie's approach and compares it to the initial
proposal. Indeed, by proposing essentially similar changes in the way
the law should define and evaluate competency, both approaches attempt to reshape the existing doctrine and eliminate its most objectionable features.
Section II reviews the historical origins of the incompetency docthe state seeks to administer punishment, including capital punishment. Defense counsel
usually raises the issue, but the prosecution or the court may also raise it, even over the
opposition of the defendants who may prefer to proceed notwithstanding their mental
illness. When the competency issue is raised, a court typically will appoint several clinical
evaluators to conduct a formal assessment of the defendant's competency. These clinical
evaluators examine the defendant and then submit written reports to the court. The court
then decides the issue, sometimes following a hearing at which the examiners testify and
are subject to cross-examination. If the court finds the defendant incompetent, it suspends
the criminal proceedings and remands the defendant for treatment, typically on an inpatient basis. Treatment is designed not to cure the defendant, but to restore competency.
If such restoration is thought to have been achieved, a new round of evaluations and hearings will occur, and if the court is satisfied concerning the defendant's competence, it will
resume the criminal proceedings. See generally BruceJ. Winick, Inonnpetency to Stand Tria"
Developments in the Law, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND

SocuAL. SCIENCE 3 (John Monahan & HenryJ. Steadman eds., 1983) [hereinafter MENTALLY
DISORDERED OFFENDERS].

2 Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
3 Medina v. California, 112 S. C. 2572 (1992).
4 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
5 BruceJ. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Tria4 32 UClA L. REv. 921 (1985)
[hereinafter Restructuring Competency]; see also Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial:
An Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposalfor Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 243 (1987)
[hereinafter Incompetency to Stand TriA].
6 RichardJ. Bonnie, The Competence of CriminalDefendants:Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47
U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993).
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trine and its modern justifications and describes existing practices and
the costs and burdens they impose. Section III offers several proposals for a broad restructuring of the incompetency doctrine: A central
feature of the overall proposal is that the law should distinguish between cases in which defendants seek an incompetency determination
and its resulting postponement of the criminal proceedings; and cases
in which defendants object to an incompetency determination, preferring to proceed to trial or to accept a guilty plea notwithstanding their
impairment. For defendants who assert their incompetency as a bar
to trial, courts should substitute a system of trial continuances for the
formal incompetency process. For those who object to an incompetency determination, courts can and should permit them to waive the
"benefits" of the incompetency doctrine in cases in which counsel
either recommends such waiver or concurs with the defendant's expressed preference. Section III also analyzes the constitutionality of
permitting this waiver by a defendant whose decisionmaking and communicative abilities are reduced by mental illness, and argues that this
waiver can be both constitutional and consistent with the purposes of
the incompetency doctrine.
Section III next suggests that courts should apply a lower standard of competency in cases in which the defendant seeks an incompetency determination than in cases in which the defendant objects to
an incompetency determination. Next, it proposes the adoption of a
procedural presumption in favor of competency in cases in which the
defendant's lawyer recommends waiver of the protections of the competency doctrine or concurs with the defendant's choice to waive this
protection. In addition, it compares this approach with Professor
Bonnie's approach and attempts to reconcile the two approaches,
concluding that the approaches are essentially consistent and that
their adoption would harmonize the incompetency doctrine with its
underlying purposes.
This Article analyzes problems of incompetency to stand trial resulting only from mental illness. Sometimes defendants are found incompetent as a result of mental retardation. The issues raised by
mental retardation are distinct from those raised by mental illness.
Unlike mental illness, mental retardation is congenital, untreatable,
and unchangeable. Moreover, individuals with mental retardation are
always of sub-average intelligence and are often extremely vulnerable
to suggestive influences, making waiver issues problematic. For these
and other reasons, the discussion in this Article is limited to incompetency produced by mental illness. 7
7 SeeJames W. Ellis, Decisionsby andforPeoplewith MentalRetardation:BalancingConsider-
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INCOMPETENCY IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: HISTORICAL ORIGINS

AND PRESENT PRACTICES
A.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE INCOMPETENCY DOCTRINE

The common law origins of the incompetency doctrine date back
to mid-seventeenth century England. Blackstone wrote that a defendant who becomes "mad" after the commission of an offense should
not be arraigned "because he is not able to plead... with the advice
and caution that he ought," and should not be tried, for "how can he
make his defense?"8 The ban on trial of an incompetent defendant
stems from the common law prohibition on trials in absentia, 9 and
from the difficulties the English courts encountered when defendants
frustrated the ritual of the common law trial by remaining mute instead of pleading to charges.' 0 Without a plea, the trial could not go
forward. In such cases, English courts were obliged to determine
whether a defendant was "mute by visitation of God" or "mute of malice." If "mute of malice," the defendant was subjected to a form of
medieval torture, the peineforte et dure, in which increasingly heavier
weights were placed upon the defendant's chest in an effort to compel
a plea. If "mute by visitation of God," the defendant was spared this
painful ritual. The category "mute by visitation of God" originally encompassed the "deaf and dumb," but its scope gradually expanded to
include "lunatics."
At this early stage in the development of the incompetency doctrine in England, self-representation rather than representation by
counsel was the common practice.'" Indeed, in serious criminal cases,
counsel was prohibited, and the law required the defendant to "appear before the court in his own person and conduct his own defense
ations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 Vi. L. REV. 1779 (1992); James W. Ellis & Ruth A.
Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414 (1985).
8 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTAIEs* 24 (9th ed. 1783); see also 1 MATTHEw HALE,
THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN* 34-35 (1736). For a discussion of the historic
origins of the doctrine, see GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, COMM. ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND

TRIAL 912-15 (1974); Winick, supra note 1, at 3-4; Restructuring Competency, supranote 5, at
952-53.
9 Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of CriminalDefendants, 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 832, 834 (1960);JamesJ. Gobert, Competency to Stand Triak A Pre-and-PostJacksonAnal-

ysis, 40 TENN. L. REV. 659, 660 n.11 (1973); see, e.g., Frith's Case, 22 How. St. Tr. 307 (1790);
Kinloch's Case, 18 How. St. Tr. 395 (1746).
10 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 8, at 887-88, 912-13; Winick,
supra note 1, at 3-4.
11 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1975). For an analysis of the historical origins of the right to counsel, see BruceJ. Winick, Forfeitureof Attorneys'Fees Under RICO and
CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The ConstitutionalDilemma and How to Avoid I 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 765, 786-99 (1989).
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in his own words." 12 The prohibition against the assistance of counsel
continued for centuries in felony and treason cases.' 3 As a result, during the formative period of the incompetency doctrine, in many cases,
the defendant stood alone before the court, and trial was merely "a
long argument between the prisoner and the counsel for the
Crown."' 4 Thus, it was imperative that defendants be competent because they were required to conduct their own defense.
The common law rationale for the incompetency doctrine has become largely obsolete. 15 Today, the assistance of counsel is available
as a matter of constitutional right.16 As a result, in the modem criminal case, it is counsel that must be competent, and the competence of
the defendant, although still required, takes on a secondary
importance.
B.

MODERN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INCOMPETENCY DOCTRINE

Although the common law justifications for the doctrine have
been largely eclipsed, a number ofjustifications remain for the modem doctrine. In part, parens patriae considerations-the desire to prevent unfairness to the defendant and an erroneous conviction that
could result from requiring the defendant to stand trial while significantly impaired by mental illness-justify it. Counsel makes many of
the strategic decisions in the modem criminal trial, and the defendant, if impaired, may be unable or unwilling to communicate critical
facts to counsel or the court. 17 This concern has led the Supreme
Court to deem the bar against trying an incompetent defendant "fundamental to an adversary system ofjustice."' 8 Avoiding inaccuracy in
criminal adjudication serves not only the individual's interests in
12 Faretta,422 U.S. at 823 (quoting I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 211 (2d ed. 1898)).
13 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAILA.ND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211,
211 (2d ed. 1898)); 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 341

(1883).
14 Faretta, 428 U.S. at 823-24 (CitingSTEPHEN, supranote 13, at 326). The ban on representation by counsel in felony cases was eroded by the courts beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, and was finally eliminated by statute in England in 1836. Id. at 825.
15 Gobert, supranote 9, at 660 n.1 1; Winick, supra note 1, at 5; RestructuringCompetency,
supra note 5, at 953; Note, Inompetenty to Stand Trial 81 HARv.L. REv. 454, 467 (1967).
16 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). Under the Sixth Amendment, the accused may be represented by counsel of
choice "in all criminal prosecutions." U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Winick, supra note 8, at
789-90, 798-99. In addition, counsel will be appointed for indigent defendants in all felony
and in serious misdemeanor cases in which the defendant receives a term of imprisonment. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37, 40.
17 See HENRY WEiHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CmMINAL DEFENSE 429-30 (1954); Bonnie, supra note 6, at 552.
18 Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
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avoiding unjust conviction, but also the societal interest in the reliability of the criminal process. 19
The incompetency doctrine also preserves the dignity of the criminal process. This process would be threatened by trying defendants
who lack a meaningful understanding of the nature of the criminal
proceedings. 20 This justification relates to the need to insure public
respect and confidence in the criminal process, considerations that
21
are basic to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
The incompetency doctrine also protects criminal defendants' in22
terest in autonomous decisionmaking concerning their defense.

Although counsel decides many issues of strategy and tactics, defendants must make certain key decisions, 23 such as decisions whether to

plead guilty, whether to waive jury trial, whether to be present during
trial, and whether to testify. 24 The importance of these decisions
makes it imperative that the defendant is competent to make them.

A final justification for the incompetency doctrine is the need to
preserve the courtroom decorum and the resulting dignity of the trial
process that permitting the trial of mentally impaired defendants unable to control their courtroom conduct could threaten. 25 However,

in light of alternative measures for dealing with this problem, it alone
should not serve to justify barring the trial of an otherwise competent
defendant.
C.

26

THE MODERN PRACTICE

All American jurisdictions deem criminal defendants incompe-

tent to stand trial if, as a result of mental illness, they are unable to
understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist counsel in mak19 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 543-44; Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 954-55.
20 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 543, 551.
21 Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 957; Winick, supra note 1, at 5.
22 See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and PsychologicalPerspectives, 37 ViL. L. Rav.
1705, 1747-53 (1992) (analyzing the criminal accused's right to autonomy over the
defense).
23 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 553.
24 See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1987) (decision to testify); Brookhart v.
Janus, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (decision to plead guilty); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (decision to waive jury trial); see alsojones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("IT]he accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive ajury, testify in his
or her own behalf, or take an appeal .... .") (dicta); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93
n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Timothy P. O'Neil, Vindicatingthe Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify at a Criminal Trial: The Needfor an On-The-Record Waiver, 51 U. Prrr. L.
Rav. 809 (1990); Restructuring Competency, supranote 5, at 959 n. 181. See generallyABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE § 4-5.2 (a) (1986).
25 See RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at 853-54; Note, supra note 15, at 458.
26 See Bonnie, supranote 6, at 551 n.49; Restructuring Competency, supranote 5, at 853-54.
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ing a defense. 2 7 Courts order virtually all criminal defendants who

appear to be mentally ill at any time in the criminal trial process to be

evaluated for competency. 28 Usually, defense counsel raises the competency issue by-filing a motion requesting a competency evaluation.
The prosecution may also raise the issue by motion. In addition, the
judge may, sua sponte, request a competency evaluation when the evidence presents a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency. 2 9
When there are reasonable grounds to question a defendant's compe-

tency, a court's failure to order a competency evaluation violates the
defendant's right to due process, requiring reversal of any conviction.3 0 As a result, courts typically order a formal competency evaluation in virtually every case in which there is a doubt about the
defendant's competency.3 1 Several studies have concluded that the
vast majority of defendants are referred for competency evaluations
inappropriately and have suggested that the competency process is
32
often invoked for strategic purposes.
27 See generay ABA CRiMiNALJUSricE MENTqAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.1 (1989). For

detailed descriptions of the competency process as it functions in several states, see RONALm ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1980) (North Carolina); HENRY J. STEA MAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FouND INCOMPETENT TO STAND
TRIAL (1979) (New York); BruceJ. Winick, The Mentally DisorderedDefendant in Florida, in
FLORIDA CRiMINAL RuLFs AND PitacrlcE §§ 7.2-7.44 (1991) (Florida).

28 RestructuringCompetency, supranote 5, at 924. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181
(1975) ("a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would
render the accused unable to meet the[se] standards of competence to stand trial").
29 Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
30 Id. at 162; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
31 RestructuringCompetency, supranote 5, at 925; see, e.g., ROEscH & GOLDING, supra note
27, at 191-93 (reporting on survey ofjudicial attitudes in North Carolina). These formal
evaluations, performed by two to three court-appointed clinicians, who submit written reports to the court, are usually conducted on an out-patient basis in the jail or the court
clinic, although in a minority ofjurisdictions, they are performed on an in-patient basis.
See Thomas Grisso et al., The Organizationof PretrialForensic Serices, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
377 (1994).
32 RestructuringCompetency, supranote 5, at 933; see, e.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEATH STANDARDS introduction at 7.142-43, 7.162 (1st tent. draft 1983) [hereinafter ABA
TENTATIVE DRAFr]; BRUCEJ. ENNIs & RICHARD D. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS:

102-03
(1978); ROESCH & GOLDING, supranote 27, at 49-50, 192-98; Paul A. Chernoff & William G.
Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Il: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 505, 515-16
(1972); Gerald Cooke et al., FactorsAffecting Referral to Determine Competency to Stand Tria
130 Am.J. PsYcHIATRY 870, 874 (1973); Stephen L. Golding et al., Assessment and Conctualization of Competency to Stand Trial,8 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 321, 322, 332 (1984); Abraham L.
Halpern, Use and Misuse of Psychiatry in Competency Examinations of CriminalDefendants, 5
PSYCHIATRIc ANNAts 123, 124 (1975); A. Louis McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for Trial and Mental Illness: Review and Preview, 49 B.U. L. REV. 46, 47-50 (1969);
Ronald Roesch & Stephen L.Golding, Treatment and DispositionofDefendantsFound Incompetent to Stand TriaLk A Review and a Proposal 2 INT'L J.L. & PsvcHIATY 349, 366 (1979);
Saleem A. Shah, Legal and Mental Health System Interactions: MajorDevelopments and Research
Needs, 4 INT'LJ.L. & PsvcmArv 219, 242-43 (1981); HenryJ. Steadman &Jeraldine Braff
THE REVISED EDITION OF THE BAsIC ACLU GUIDE TO A MENTAL PATIENT'S RIGHTS
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It is estimated that 25,000 defendants are evaluated for competency in the United States each year, and that the number is increasing.3 3

Perhaps because the threshold for requiring a competency

hearing is low, a large percentage of defendants evaluated are found
competent-as many as ninety-six percent or more in some jurisdictions, and probably no less than seventy-five percent in mostjurisdictions.3 4 Nearly all of those found incompetent are hospitalized for
treatment.3 5 These defendants are treated, usually with psychotropic
drugs,3 6 and most are returned to court within several months, as having been "restored" to competency.3 7 Some are hospitalized for
longer periods, and some are never restored to competency.3 8
D.

THE COSTS AND BURDENS OF THE COMPETENCY PROCESS

The existing competency process imposes substantial burdens on
defendants and is extremely costly, yet a considerable number of defendants may not require formal evaluation.3 9
Empirical research on the costs of competency evaluation and
treatment is almost non-existent. However, data from a study conducted ten years ago of costs in Dade County, Florida are useful as a
rough basis for projecting national costs. 40 Evaluation costs for an ini-

tial competency assessment averaged $2327, excluding court costs and
the expense of additional defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge
Crimes ofViolence and Incompetency Diversion, 66J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73 (1975); Henry
J. Steadman & Eliot Hartstone, Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial, in MErNTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS, supranote 1, at 42; Alan A. Stone, Comment, 135 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 61, 62
(1978); David B. Wexler et al., Special Project-TheAdministrationof PsychiatrieJustice: Theory
and Practicein Arizona, 13 Auz. L. REv. 1, 161-62 (1971).
33 See Steadman & Hartstone, supra note 32, at 41-42.

34 Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Competency to Stand
Triak An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court's New Due ProcessMethodology
in Criminal Cases, 47 U. Mtami L. REv. 817, 847-48 (1993) (citing studies).
35 Roesch & Golding, supra note 32, at 349; Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at
925.
36 For an analysis of the use of psychotropic drugs in the treatment of incompetent
defendants and the legal issues raised, see Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication in the
Criminal Trial Process: The Constitutionaland Therapeutic Implications ofRiggins v. Nevada, 10
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 637 (1993).
37 See Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 936 (the ordinary defendant hospitalized
for incompetency in Dade County, Florida spent seven months in the state hospital).
38 See id. at 938.
39 Id. at 932-33. A variety of strategic reasons spur courts and attorneys to seek formal
evaluations more frequently than necessary. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
The high percentage of defendants found competent and the use of competency screening instruments in somejurisdictions suggest that a less formal screening mechanism could
be used to minimize the formal evaluation process. See Restructuring Competency, supra note
5, at 933.
40 Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 935-37.
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time. These costs were based on outpatient evaluations. Inpatient
evaluations for competency, still used in some jurisdictions, could easily double or even quadruple these costs. 41 Defendants found incom-

petent at this initial stage are hospitalized for several months of
treatment, at an added average cost of $20,351.42 Thus, the total cost
for a typical defendant found incompetent in Dade County exceeded
$22,678. Costs for some cases ran considerably higher.43
Using these Dade County figures, which are estimated to be low
and are based on costs prevailing ten years ago, it can be estimated
that in excess of $185 million is spent annually on competency evaluation and treatment in America.44 The costs today may be two or three
times higher. With attorney and court costs included, the costs of the
competency process nationally may exceed one billion dollars per
year. Moreover, formal competency evaluations occur in many cases
in which less formal screenings could suffice. Therefore, the competency determination results in a diversion of limited clinical resources
that otherwise could be used for treatment.
The competency process also frequently imposes serious burdens
on defendants. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1972 decision inJackson
v. Indiana,45 defendants hospitalized for treatment following a determination of incompetency to stand trial received what amounted to
an indeterminate sentence of confinement in a mental hospital, typically for many years, often exceeding the maximum sentence for the
crime charged, and sometimes lasting a lifetime. 4 In Jackson, the
Court recognized a constitutional limit on the duration of incompetency commitment, holding that a defendant committed solely based
on trial incompetency "cannot be held more than a reasonable period
of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future."47 Any continued confinement, the Court held, must be based
41 Id.at 935 n.56 (based on Minnesota data). A recent study concluded that "the traditional use of centrally located, inpatient facilities for obtaining pretrial evaluations survives
in only a minority of states, having been replaced by other models that employ various
types of outpatient approaches." Grisso, supranote 31, at 388.
42 RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at 936. This excludes several thousand dollars

in court costs, attributable to attorney time and hearings.
4 Id. at 936 n.57 (discussing a case in which the defendant was held for competency
evaluation and treatment for a period of over 10 years, at a cost estimated to exceed
$300,000).
44 Dade County uses a relatively inexpensive system of out-patient evaluations, compared to somejurisdictions which use expensive inpatient evaluations more frequently. Id.
at 937.
45 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
46 RestruturingCompetency, supra note 5, at 938.
47 406 U.S. at 738.
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on the probability that the defendant would become competent
within the foreseeable future. If the treatment provided does not advance the defendant toward competency, then the state must either
institute customary civil commitment proceedings to detain the defendant, or release the defendant.48 Although Jackson marked an end
to the most egregious cases of indefinite incompetency commitment,
many states have responded insufficiently to the Court's decision, and
abuses persist.49
Lengthy incompetency commitment is particularly burdensome
for defendants charged with misdemeanors-perhaps a majority of
those found incompetent. 50 If convicted, many of these defendants
would pay a small fine or receive a period of probation. Instead, they
might spend months or years confined as incompetent. Many of the
hospitals in which defendants are confined are maximum security institutions that are poorly funded and staffed. 5 ' Although many states
now authorize outpatient treatment for trial incompetency, most defendants found incompetent are hospitalized. 5 2 Such hospitalization
is frequently unnecessarily restrictive of defendant's liberty and stigmatizing. 53 In some jurisdictions, even where forensic hospitalization
is not prolonged, other abuses occur. Those jurisdictions use shortterm commitment based on incompetency to stand trial as an alternative to ordinary civil commitment.5 4 In misdemeanor cases, these defendants often will be released after several months with their charges
dismissed. However, even this period of hospital confinement may be
unnecessary, may not satisfy state commitment criteria, and will be
more restrictive and less therapeutic than typical civil hospitalization.
Even for those defendants found competent, a court-ordered
competency evaluation often prevents the setting of bail, thereby insuring that the defendant remains in custody, and separated from
55
family, friends, and other community ties for a lengthy period.
Moreover, laws frequently fail to credit this period of confinement
against a sentence later imposed.5 6 As a result, defendants who are
evaluated may be confined for longer than they would have been had
48 Id.; see Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 939-41.
49 GARY B. MELTON ET AL., COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND THE CoURTs: AN
EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY-BASED FORENSIC SERVICES 3 (1985); Restructuring Competenwy,
supra note 5, at 940-41.
50 RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at 942.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 943.
53 Id. at 944-45.

54 See Personal communication from Richard J. Bonnie to the author (Nov. 28, 1994)
(on file with author) (describing a Virginia practice).

55 RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at 946-47.
56 Id. at 947.
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they been permitted to waive their incompetency and either plead
guilty or stand trial at the outset.
These delays undermine the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a
speedy trial. During the period in which incompetency evaluation
and treatment occurs, witnesses may die or disappear, memories may
fade, and evidence may become lost or unavailable. These difficulties
can burden both the defense and the prosecution, and may significantly impede a just and reliable disposition of the charges. In addition, lengthy delays may compromise the basic purposes of criminal
law. If the defendant is guilty, delay in the trial process diminishes the
possibility for rehabilitation. Delayed punishment may also weaken
the deterrent effect of the criminal sanction and frustrate the interests
of victims in seeing justice done.
The incompetency determination also imposes a serious stigma
on defendants labeled incompetent to stand trial. Although these defendants already bear the stigma of a criminal accusation, the added
57
stigma of being labelled incompetent may be considerably worse.
Moreover, these defendants are further stigmatized by being associated with the often-notorious institutions to which they are committed-high security mental health correctional facilities like
Dannamoura, Bridgewater, or Ionia-that evoke in the public imagination an image of the dangerously mad.5 8
The label "incompetent" also has an unfortunate general and
global connotation that may make defendants feel not only that they
are unfit to stand trial, but also that they are incompetent to do anything.5 9 Moreover, the "incompetent" label suggests a permanent deficit, rather than a temporary impairment. Individuals so labeled may
come to think that their difficulties cannot be helped. This can impede successful treatment. Imposition of an incompetency label,
57 See ABA TENTAnvE DRAft,

supra note 32, Standard 74.2(c) commentary at 7.160.

58 Id.; Robert A. Burt, Of Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils of the "Criminal-Insane,"123

U. PA. L Ry. 258, 260-63 (1974); BruceJ. Winick, PsychotropicMedication and Competence to
Stand Trial,1977 Am. B. FouND. REs.J. 769, 807 (1977); RestructuringCompetenwy, supranote
5, at 944.
59 See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implicationsfor
Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL, PUB. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 1995); see alsoBruce D. Sales
& Lynn R. Kahle, Law and Attitudes Toward the Mentally Il, 3 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 391,
394 (1980).
[T]he term "incompetent to stand trial" implies a trait-like permanent malady when,
in fact, the concept it should convey legally is really a temporary one. An incompetent
person is one whom we would expect to stay that way. The term "unableto stand trial"
is less laden with unnecessary trait-like and permanent implications because unable
people often later become able. Attribution theories of attitude change would predict
that trait-like attributions should carry more negative connotations than terms that
imply more ephemeral phenomena.

Id.
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therefore, can be extremely debilitating to the individual. 60 Many
criminal defendants already have problems that they feel are beyond
their control. Labeling these defendants incompetent, particularly
against their will, can foster what Martin Seligman called "learned
helplessness." This syndrome, characterized by generalized feelings of
helplessness, hopelessness, depression, and lack of motivation, 61 mir62
rors the symptoms of clinical depression.
Thus, in practice, the incompetency doctrine raises significant
problems and imposes substantial burdens on defendants and high
costs on states. Although designed for their protection, the competency process places such substantial burdens upon defendants, that
the American Bar Association Committee, which developed the Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, suggested that defense attorneys
may conclude that it is in their clients' best interests not to raise the
63
issue of competency.
III.
A.

RESTRUCTURING THE INCOMPETENCY PROCESS

DISTINGUISHING ASSENT FROM OBJECTION

The ABA Committee has indicated that if the problems associated with the competency doctrine persist, "perhaps we should ad60 See Winick, supranote 59.
61 See generally MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT,

& Martin E.P. Seligman eds., 1980); Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness In Humans: An
AttributionalAnalysis, in HUMAN HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra, at 3; Lyn Y.
Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation, 87J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 49 (1978); Steven F. Maier & Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessnes.. Theoy
and Evidence, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1976).
62 Christopher Peterson & Lisa M. Bossio, Learned Helplessness, in SELF-DEFEATING BEAND DEATH (1975); HUMAN HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (Judy Garber

HAVIORS: EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH, CLINICAL IMPRESSIONS, AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 235,

236 (1989).
63 According to the Committee:
Because of the sometimes severe consequences historically attendant upon a determination of incompetence defense counsel may conclude that it is in the defendant's
best interest to proceed to trial although technically the defendant might be incompetent to stand trial. For example, the length of involuntary commitment for treatment
to restore competence may extend well beyond the possible maximum sentence for a
relatively minor offense; a finding of mental illness could result in stigma which the
defendant finds more opprobrious than the stigma of conviction; the evaluation itself
may require the defendant to reveal to a court-appointed expert information which
the defendant would prefer to keep secret; in a case in which the probable penalty is a
relatively minor fine, introduction of the cumbersome incompetence evaluation proceedings appears an unnecessary expenditure of systemic resources. The defendant
may even prefer to be punished by being sentenced to a prison than to be committed
to a mental hospital for treatment, given the inadequate conditions in many public
mental institutions. The defense attorney may also feel, if the case against the defendant is weak or if the defense does not depend upon the competence of the client, that
the defense would prevail at trial despite the defendant's incompetence.
ABA TENTATIVE DRAFr, supra note 32, Standard 7-4.2(c) commentary at 7.160.
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dress more clearly the concept of possible waiver on the part of a
defendant."6 4 Under existing practices, defendants deemed incompetent may not stand trial or plead guilty even if they wish to do so.65 In
addition, existing practices require a defense attorney to raise the
competency question to the court whenever a genuine doubt about
competency arises, even if counsel believes that raising the issue will
66
not be in the defendant's best interest.
In a 1985 article, I suggested that waiver of incompetency might
be possible in limited circumstances. I argued that the law should
permit defendants impaired by mental illness to stand trial or plead
guilty if, with the concurrence of counsel, they clearly and voluntarily
expressed their desire to do so. 67 I suggested that the incompetency
process be restructured to distinguish between two different types of
cases: cases in which defendants assert their own incompetency as a
ground for temporarily halting criminal proceedings, and cases in
which the prosecution or the court seeks incompetency status, but defendants wish to proceed notwithstanding their impairment. I argued
that, in the former cases, a system of trial continuances should replace
the existing formal competency process. 68 In the latter cases, courts
should consider allowing waiver when the defendant clearly and voluntarily expresses a preference for trial or a guilty plea, and defense
counsel concurs. I argued, finally, that even if the court deems the
defendant incompetent to waive the supposed benefits of the incompetency doctrine, it should permit defense counsel to waive the doctrine on behalf of the defendant on the grounds that defense lawyers,
as fiduciaries, can substitute their judgment for that of an incompetent client.
This proposal for restructuring the incompetency-to-stand-trial
doctrine was controversial. It challenged thinking that regarded comId at 7.162.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1974) ("It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and
object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing
his defense may not be subjected to a trial."); ABA TENTATIVE DRAFr, supra note 32, at
7.148 (referring to the "apparent conclusion of the Supreme Court that the prohibition
[on trying the incompetent defendant] is an absolute one: a defendant who is determined
to be incompetent to stand trial cannot, in any event, be tried"); see, e.g., Hamm v.Jabe, 706
F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1983) (trial court, over objection, properly halted trial once it became
convinced defendant was incompetent, even though defense wished trial to continue
under proposal that the defendant be excused from courtroom during potentially disturbing testimony). The Supreme Court recently reiterated this constitutional bar. Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2579 (1992).
66 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 74.2 (1989).
67 Restructu7ing Competency, supranote 5, at 927-28.
68 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
64
65
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petency as an essential prerequisite for waiver of fights in the criminal
process and seemed inconsistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. However, allowing a defendant of doubtful competence to waive the "benefits" of the incompetency doctrine would not
violate the purposes of the doctrine as long as there were safeguards,
69
including requiring the advice and agreement of counsel.
I also argued that the Supreme Court's language in Pate v. Robinson, suggesting that incompetent defendants could not waive the in70 I
competency status, was dicta and could therefore be discarded.
examined legal and clinical practices, both in the criminal area and
elsewhere, that accept waiver in situations in which the individual
whose rights are waived never participates in the decision to waive or
is of doubtful competence. 71 These practices suggest that the law
should permit a defendant either to accept trial or a guilty plea or to
object to trial on the basis of mental illness. I suggested that customary conceptions of competency in the criminal process were artificial,
based on myth, unrealistic models of the criminal process, and unfounded distinctions between mentally ill criminal defendants and
"normal" defendants. 72
In the ten years since advancing these proposals, I have developed further some of the ideas on which they were based. More specifically, my work in therapeutic jurisprudence explored in greater
detail the distinction between assent and objection and the implications of this distinction for defining competency.7 3 I have analyzed
69 Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 952-59.
70 Id. at 968-70.

71 Id. at 959-68.

Id. at 970-75.
73 Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests the need for study of the therapeutic implications of various legal rules and practices. The law functions as a therapeutic agent, producing either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic jurisprudence
accordingly seeks to focus attention on an often neglected ingredient in the calculus necessary for performing a sensible policy analysis of law-the therapeutic dimension-and calls
72

for its systematic empirical examination. See generalyDAVID B. WEXLER & BRuCEJ. WI~c,
EssAYS IN THERAPEUTICJURISPRUDENCE (1992); Symposium, TherapeuticJurisprudence:Restruc-

tuing Mental DisabilityLaw, 10 N.Y.L. ScH.J. HUM. RTS. 623-926 (1993); Michael L. Perlin,
VWhat is TherapeuticJurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. Scii.J. HUM. RTs. 623 (1993); David B. Wexler,
TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 17
(1993); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, The Potential of TherapeuticJurisprudence: A New
Approach to Psychology and the Law, in LAw AND PSYCHOLOGY. THE BROADENING OF THE DisciPUNE 211 (James R.P. Ogloff ed., 1992); David B. Wexler & BruceJ. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceas a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MiLai
L. REv. 979 (1991); David B. Wexler & BruceJ. Winick, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Criminat Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENT. & PHnS. Dis. L. REP. 225 (1992). For a recent
bibliography of therapeutic jurisprudence work, see Bibliography of TherapeuticJurispnudence,
10 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTs. 915 (1993).
To identify the therapeutic dimension as a significant factor is not, of course, to sug-
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the use of this distinction in two non-criminal areas-competency to
consent to treatment and competency to consent to voluntary hospi-talization. 74 Further, I have analyzed autonomy values and their role
in mental health law, 75 and explored the psychological value of allowing individuals to exercise choice 7 6 and the corresponding disadvantages of denying them the opportunity to be self-determining. 77 In
addition, I have analyzed the various procedural modes for determining competency, 78 including the role of presumptions and burdens of
proof in this process.79 This reconsideration over the last ten years
has led to several refinements in my arguments and additional proposals. The following section responds to several criticisms of the initial
proposal and sets forth further thinking on how to reform the incompetency process.
B.

WAIVER AND THE PURPOSES OF THE INCOMPETENCY DOCTRINE

In a recent article, Professor Richard Bonnie, although endorsing
much of my proposal, criticized my suggestion that incompetent defendants should be able to waive the "benefits" of incompetency status.8 0 Professor Bonnie pointed out that the incompetency doctrine is

not designed solely to protect the defendant's interests, but also serves
societal interests by preserving the moral dignity of the criminal process and by reducing the number of erroneous convictions. Professor
Bonnie argued that permitting trial of an incompetent defendant
8
might compromise both of these benefits. '
Properly understood, my proposal does not suggest that incompegest that it should trump other considerations. Countervailing normative considerations
may often justify a legal rule or practice found to produce antitherapeutic consequences,
and therapeutic jurisprudence does not purport to be a method of determining which
factor should predominate in decisionmaking. See David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health,
and TherapeuticJurisprulene 40 CLEv. ST.L REv. 517 (1992). Its mission is merely to raise
questions that call for a more complete analysis of the relevant considerations, and to use
insights from the social and behavioral sciences to attempt to reshape the law so that it can
more effectively serve therapeutic ends.
74 Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction between Assent and
Objection, 28 Hous. L. Rv. 15 (1991) [hereinafter Competency for Treatment]; Bruce J.
Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A TherapeuticJuiisprudenceAnalysis
of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 169 (1991) [hereinafter Competency for
Voluntary Hospitalization].
75 BruceJ. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and PsychologicalPerspectives,37 ViL. L. REv. 1705
(1992).
76 Id. at 1755-68; BruceJ. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99 (1994).
77 Winick, supra note 59.

Competeny for Voluntary Hospitalization, supranote 74, at 199-212.
Winick, supra note 34.
80 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 543-44.
78
79

81 Id. at 543.
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tent defendants be permitted to waive the incompetency status. Moreover, a proper analysis of the various policies served by the
incompetency doctrine, including those discussed by Professor Bonnie, are fully consistent with my proposals. My article acknowledged
that moral dignity and reliability of the criminal process and other
82
societal interests are thought to justify the incompetency doctrine,
but questioned "whether in practice the competency doctrine actually
accomplishes these asserted benefits." 83 Perhaps some of the benefits
of the incompetency doctrine apply to defendants who assert their
incompetency as a basis for postponing their trials ("objectors" to
trial). It is possible that these benefits outweigh the burdens the doctrine imposes upon such defendants. 84 However, for defendants who,
with the approval of counsel, prefer trial or a guilty plea ("assenters"),
these benefits may be more theoretical than real, and may not outweigh the burdens imposed by the doctrine.
My proposal assumes that the defendant has the ability clearly
and voluntarily to articulate a preference for either a trial or for a
guilty plea. It also assumes that defense counsel, after careful consideration, concurs in the judgment that this preference is reasonable in
the circumstances and that the client's assent is not irrational. This
requirement is consistent with the role of the defense lawyer. After
defense lawyers receive sufficient information from the defendant and
investigate the facts and the law, they typically will select an appropriate defense strategy.8 5 When the defendant assents to this strategy,
and counsel thinks the defendant has a basic understanding of the
choice made, counsel's judgment is entitled to great weight. In most
cases it will be counsel's recommendation to go to trial or to enter a
guilty plea to which the defendant assents. In some cases, however,
the choice will originate with the defendant, and counsel will approve
of or at least acquiesce in this choice. Counsel's agreement with the
client's choice provides an assurance by a person who has a professional fiduciary relationship with the defendant that proceeding to
trial or entering a guilty plea is in the defendant's best interests. In
such cases, deference both to the autonomy of the defendant and to
the professional expertise of counsel make it appropriate to erect a
presumption in favor of competency. Counsel's acquiescence provides reasonable assurance that accuracy in adjudication will not be
frustrated. A defense attorney concerned that allowing a guilty plea
82

RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at 949-50.

83 Id. at 950.

Bonnie, supranote 6, at 543-44.
85 See RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at 971-72 (discussing the role of counsel in
the attorney-client relationship in criminal cases).
84
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or proceeding to trial with an impaired defendant might result in an
unjust conviction, because either the client lacks a basic understanding of the choice made or the choice made seems clearly inconsistent
with the defendant's interests, should not provide the concurrence
that my proposal requires.
Allowing a trial that is sought by both defendants and their counsel to proceed is a provisional decision that the trial judge can rescind
if, as the case unfolds, concerns for accuracy arise. Moreover, if defense counsel realize that the defendant's impairment is more significant than earlier thought and that the client's inabilities seem likely to
produce an inaccurate result, then they can seek a determination of
incompetency based upon this new information. Because competency
is a fluctuating state, and a defendant's condition may change during
the course of a trial, the trial judge has a duty to reconsider the issue
any time there is a reasonable doubt about the defendant's
86
competency.
The trial court can also minimize the risk of inaccuracy in adjudication by using its power to set aside verdicts in the interest of justice, 7 or allowing a new trial if additional evidence affecting the
verdict later materializes that would have been available but for the
defendant's incompetency.8 8 Thus, a number of safety valves prevent
truly incompetent defendants from subjecting themselves to trials.
It is necessary to consider the concern for accuracy in adjudication in perspective. Waivers are customarily accepted in other criminal contexts, even though allowing them might affect accuracy. First,
the Supreme Court has held that defendants may waive the right to
counsel and represent themselves.8 9 Thus, the Court recognizes that
86 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975) ("[A] trial court must always be alert
to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the
standards of competence to stand trial."); Winick, supranote 34, at 841. At best, a pretrial
competency determination constitutes a prediction about how the defendant will perform
at a future trial. If during trial, defense counsel, contrary to an initial assessment, concludes that the defendant's impairment is materially interfering with the ability to communicate or provide essential assistance, the attorney then can bring concrete examples of
such incapacities to the court's attention and seek a mistrial. The court possesses broad
discretion concerning the grant of a mistrial and can at that point order a clinical evaluation of competency to assist in determining the issue. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
342-43 (1970); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934); FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)-(c).
See also Harnm v. Jabe, 706 F.2d 765, 768 (6th Cir. 1983) (defense counsel proposed that
his marginally competent client be excused from the courtroom during potentially disturbing testimony, but the court instead declared the defendant incompetent and stopped
trial).
.87 E.g., FED. R. CiuM. P. 33.
88 See Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposalfor the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea,
40 U. CHI. L. Rmv. 66, 76 (1972).
89 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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respect for individual autonomy may override the societal concern for
accuracy in adjudication.9 0 Second, defendants may plead guilty (and
thereby waive all trial-related constitutional rights) even if they are unwilling to concede commission of a crime, 9 1 and even in the absence
92
of a factual basis for believing that they have committed a crime.
Even though acceptance of such a plea may produce an erroneous
conviction, the desire to honor the accused's interest in resolving the
charges, together with the societal interest in facilitating negotiated
settlements, outweighs the concern for accuracy. These waiver of
counsel and guilty plea cases arose in contexts in which the defendant's competency was not questioned and therefore may not be as persuasive in contexts in which competency is an issue. However, they
demonstrate that deference to autonomy sometimes trumps reliability
concerns.
Finally, an incompetent defendant not represented by counsel
whose "free will" is impaired by mental illness may confess to a
crime. 93 Juries give these confessions great weight, and if they are in90 Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 955.
91 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (defendants may enter valid guilty plea
while maintaining their innocence); White Hawk v. Solem, 693 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1982)
(same), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1054 (1983); see also MODEL CODE OF PE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES § 350.4(4) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1972) (court should be able to accept a plea
"even though the defendant does not admit that he is in fact guilty if the court finds that it

is reasonable for someone in the defendant's position to plead guilty".).
92 ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTIN, THE PASSIVE JuDICIARY PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE
GUILTY PLEA 40-47 (1981); John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiriesfor all Felony and Misdemeanor
Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 88, 114-15 (1977); Malvina
Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principlesin the Administration of CriminalJustice: A Critique of
Supreme Court DecisionsSanctioningthe Plea BargainingProcess, 73 J. CiuM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY
1, 83-34 (1982). Many jurisdictions, however, prohibit acceptance of a plea without demonstration of a factual basis for the plea. See e.g., FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(f); Barkai, supra.
93 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). The defendant had a long history of
paranoid schizophrenia and had been hospitalized on numerous occasions. 1d. at 174
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Although treated in the past with antipsychotic drugs, at the
time of his confession the defendant had not taken medication for at least six months. Id.
(Brennan,J., dissenting). The defendant suffered from auditory and visual hallucinations,
which a court-appointed psychiatrist concluded interfered with his "ability to make free
and rational choices." 1d.at 161. According to the psychiatrist, the defendant experienced
.command hallucinations" in which the "voice of God" ordered him either to confess to a
killing or to commit suicide. Id. He approached a police officer on a Denver street corner
and confessed to a killing, id at 160-61, and repeated his confession following the administration of Mirandawarnings. Id. at 160. Following arrest, the defendant was found incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 161. Following treatment and his restoration to competency,
the trial court suppressed the defendant's statements as "involuntary," and the Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the initial statement was not the product of a rational intellect and free will, and that the defendant's mental condition precluded his ability to make a valid waiver of Mirandarights. Id. at 162-63. The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the defendant could waive his Mirandarights notwithstanding
the contention that such waiver was not the product of "free will" in view of the defend-
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accurate, they can produce unjust convictions. If defendants without
counsel may confess, thereby waiving their Fifth Amendment and Mirandarights notwithstanding their substantial mental impairment, why
should mentally impaired defendants who wish to accept counsel's
recommendation be unable to waive their due process right to avoid
trial while incompetent?
Professor Bonnie correctly points out that the incompetency doctrine preserves the moral dignity of the criminal process. He argues
that this interest should bar conviction of defendants "who lack a
meaningful moral understanding of wrongdoing and punishment or
the nature of criminal prosecution." 94 Would trying mentally impaired defendants in accordance with their wishes (if counsel concurs), or their desire to follow their defense counsel's
recommendation frustrate the moral dignity of the criminal process?
Two types of cases weigh against justifying a bar on trial. First, a defendant lacking an understanding of wrongdoing might qualify for
the insanity defense, and, if so, would be neither convicted nor punished. Thus, a finding of incompetency should not disqualify defendants from making an insanity defense. Second, defendants lacking a
meaningful understanding of punishment should not be punished. 95
This does not mean, however, that the defendant should not stand
trial. Indeed, courts can consider such a lack of understanding at sentencing, or at the time of the administration of punishment, or they
can defer punishment. 96
Avoiding trial of a defendant who lacks a meaningful understanding of the nature of criminal prosecution raises more serious questions. Although allowing trial for that defendant would be unfair, the
question is how much understanding would ensure that the trial does
not threaten the moral dignity of the criminal process? Setting this
standard too high would disqualify not only mentally ill defendants
from facing their charges, but also many "normal" defendants. Indeed, many criminal defendants who are not mentally ill may lack a
97
meaningful understanding of the nature of criminal prosecution.
Defendants generally are willing to defer to their attorneys, just as
most medical patients are willing to defer to their doctors concerning
appropriate medical treatment. 98 Indeed, many defendants do not
ant's mental impairment. Id. at 169-71. So long as the defendant's actions were voluntary
in the sense that they were not a product of police overreaching, his asserted lack of "free
will" was, in the Court's view, constitutionally irrelevant. Id. at 170.
94 Bonnie, suPra note 6, at 543.
95 RestructuringComptemn~y, supranote 5, at 957-58.
96 Id. at 958.
97 Id. at 971.
98 Id.
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comprehend the nature of their choices and are willing to delegate
decisionmaking to a professional in whom they place their trust.
Moreover, a complete understanding of the nature of criminal
prosecution is unnecessary in the overwhelming majority of cases that
are resolved by a guilty plea. 99 Defendants who plead guilty do not
need a high level of understanding concerning the trial process, because they will not participate in it. These defendants need only skills
sufficient to enable them to help counsel reconstruct the alleged
crime and to allow counsel to assess the strength of the prosecution's
case. However, in a substantial number of cases, mentally ill defendants, like defendants generally, are probably guilty and lack a credible
defense. For these defendants, a guilty plea is almost always the best
option. The plea negotiation process is conducted exclusively by
counsel, with little need for the client's assistance. Therefore, when
negotiations produce a plea that defendants find more desirable than
an incompetency adjudication (which will only postpone trial or a
guilty plea), the court should permit them to accept the plea, provided they possess a rudimentary understanding of the consequences
(i.e., the sentence and the foregoing of trial and the various trial-related rights). Defendants in these cases do not need a more complete
understanding of the nature of a criminal prosecution.
In Godinez v. Moran,0 0° the Supreme Court recently rejected the
contention that the standard for competency to plead guilty is higher
than the standard for competency to stand trial. The Court's opinion
suggested that the standard for competency to stand trial should be
the same as that applied to other competency questions arising in the
criminal process. The Court did not consider, however, whether
under certain circumstances the standard for competency to plead
guilty could be lower than the standard for competency to stand trial.
In fact, the notion of competency is best understood as a contextualized inquiry.' 0 ' To the extent that Godinez held that courts must apply
the same standard of competency across the board, regardless of the
99 Id. at 972. As long as defendants possess the foundational ability to consult with

counsel, Professor Bonnie would permit them to plead guilty in accordance with counsel's
recommendation, without the need for a high level of decisional competence. Bonnie,
supra note 6, at 578. Professor Bonnie would insist on more than "basic understanding"

(the ability to understand the nature and consequences of the decision) for this purpose.
Id. He would require "basic rationality" (the ability to express plausible-rather than
grossly irrational-reasons for the decision), but not "the ability to make a reasoned choice
among alternatives." Id.
100 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).

101 ABA CRMINALJUSTICE MENrAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.1 commentary at 175 (1989)
("A determination of competence or incompetence is functional in nature, context depen"); RoEScH & GOLDING, supra note 27, at 10-13;
dent and pragmatic in orientation ...
Bonnie, supranote 6, at 549.
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particular issue or the nature of the case, it is open to serious
criticism.
The criminal justice system should not base its notion of competency on a model of the criminal case that assumes a full-blown trial in
which defendants testify and in which they require considerable skills
to assist counsel in complicated strategic decisionmaking. Rather, it
should adopt a flexible standard of competency, requiring only that
the defendant possess the abilities that are necessary in the particular
case. This is particularly true in misdemeanor cases, in which an overwhelming majority of defendants plead guilty. In the past twenty
years, tightening civil commitment standards and the practice of deinstitutionalization have funneled many people who previously would
have been civil patients into the criminal courts. 102 As a result, a majority of defendants now evaluated for competency are charged with
only minor misdemeanors. 0 3 Defendants arrested for a petty offense,
such as disorderly conduct or shoplifting, can usually plead guilty and
pay a small fine. If those defendants are incompetent to stand trial,
however, they may face many months of incarceration in ajail or in a
maximum security mental hospital that resembles ajail. If defendants
eventually are restored to competency and returned to court, they
probably will accept the same plea bargain at that point. When mak102 SeeJennifer C. Bonovitz & Edward B. Guy, Impact of Restrictive Civil Commitment Procedures on a Prison PsychiatricService, 136 AM.J. PsYcHisTmy 1045, 1047-48 (1979) (increasing
numbers of jail inmates admitted to jail psychiatric service charged only with minor offenses, such as disorderly conduct or trespass, and also found to have been arrested at

family request); Walter Dickey, Incompetency and the NondangerousMentally Ill Client, 16 CraM.
L. Buu.. 22, 80-31 (1980) (42% of incompetency commitments were of persons charged
with misdemeanors; 20-25% were charged with disorderly conduct). The movement for
deinstitutionalization of civil mental patients in the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the
general tightening of civil commitment standards and expansion of the procedural protections afforded civil patients, has made the formerly easy hospitalization of the mentally ill
much more difficult. Incompetency to Stand Tia4 supra note 5, at 245. Many of these patients have continued medical, social, and housing needs that remain unmet in the communities to which they are discharged or in which they remain. Some inevitably run afoul
of the criminal law. One unintended consequence of these developments has been the
increased use of the criminal process as a means of dealing with social problems that previously would have been handled by the civil mental health system. Bonovitz & Guy, supra;
Shah, supra note 82, at 229; Linda Teplin, The C-riminalizationof the Mentally Ill. Speculation
in Search of Data, 94 PsYcHoL. BuL. 54 (1983); David B. Wexler, The Structure of Civil Commitment: Patterns,Pressures, and Interactionsin Mental Health Legislation,7 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
1, 11-12 (1983); Incompetency to Stand Trial, supranote 5, at 245-46. As a result, more mentally ill individuals are arrested and charged with minor misdemeanors, and the incompetency-to-stand-trial process has become a back-door route to the mental hospital.
103 Jeffrey L. Geller & Eric D. Lister, The Processof CriminalCommitmentforPretriaPsychiattc Examination:An Evaluation, 135 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 53, 54 (1978) (a substantial majority
of defendants hospitalized for competency evaluation were charged only with misdemeanors; 30% were charged only with disturbing the peace); RestructuringCompetency, supranote
*5, at 941-42.
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ing a guilty plea imposes such nominal consequences on the defendant, the degree of competency required of the defendant should be
relatively modest. When the potential consequences are more substantial-a felony conviction carrying a lengthy prison sentence, for
example-the degree of competency required to plead guilty should
be higher. And cases in which defendants seek to plead guilty to a
capital offense, exposing themselves to a possible death sentence, re104
quire an extremely high degree of competency and understanding.
Such a sliding-scale approach to competency is reasonable and
consistent with the desire to protect the accuracy and moral dignity of
the criminal process. Indeed, basic principles of criminal procedure
reflect this. Defendants are entitled to fewer procedural protections
when tried for petty offenses than when tried for more serious offenses. For example, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a petty offense exception to the Sixth Amendment right to trial
byjury. 10 5 Under this exception, ajury trial is unavailable in cases in
which the potential penalty does not exceed six months imprisonment. 10 6 Similarly, although the right to counsel is an essential feature of the adversary system, 10 7 indigent defendants are not entitled to
104 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983) (plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Gardne; 430 U.S. at 363-64 (White, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 187-89 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring);
BruceJ. Winick, ProsecutorialPeremptoy ChallengePractices in CapitalCases:An Empirical Study
and a ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1, 19 (1982).

105 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
106 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968). "A right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government." Id. at 156.
"Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that [the jury trial]
was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies
and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority." Id. "Providing an
accused with the right to be tried by ajury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentricjudge." Id. at 158. "[A] general grant ofjury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental
right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are
provided for all defendants." Id. Because the jury trial right serves important societal as
well as individual interests, it may not be waived unilaterally by the defendant. Singer v.
United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
107 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) ("It is undeniable that in most
criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by
their own unskilled efforts."). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932):
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put
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the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases in which they do
not receive a sentence of imprisonment,10 8 and thus must face a professional prosecutor without assistance.
A similar distinction between petty offenses and more serious
crimes exists in the incompetency-to-stand-trial context. To the extent
that concerns about accuracy and about the moral dignity of the criminal process make courts reluctant to permit guilty pleas or trials for
assenting defendants whose competency is in question, they should be
considerably less concerned when the defendant seeks to plead guilty
or stand trial for a petty misdemeanor. Concerns for reliability and
the moral dignity of the criminal process would be frustrated if grossly
incompetent defendants were permitted to plead guilty. When the
defendant is unable to understand the very notion of a guilty plea or
its consequences, counsel should not go forward with a plea. In such
cases, a delay based on the defendant's mental impairment may be
burdensome to the defendant, but these burdens arguably are justified by the societal interests in the moral dignity and the reliability of
the criminal process. However, imposing the burdens of an incompetency adjudication on an unwilling defendant who would prefer to
plead guilty in accordance with counsel's advice or with counsel's acquiescence seems unjustified unless the defendant is grossly incompetent When competence is more marginal, the societal concerns for
accuracy and the moral dignity of the criminal process should not outweigh the defendant's desire to have an expeditious resolution of the
charges.
Even if the law continues to bar guilty pleas by defendants when
there is doubt about their competence, it should recognize a petty
offense (or even a misdemeanor) exception. This exception should
apply in cases when the defendant clearly and voluntarily assents to
counsel's recommendation or expresses a desire to plead with which
counsel approves. Because a high percentage of incompetency cases
arise out of misdemeanor charges, such a rule would eliminate much
of the cost and many of the burdens of the incompetency process.
Limitations on civil commitment and the deinstitutionalization process have unintentionally funneled thousands of individuals into the
on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence.
Id.
108 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 867, 371 (1980); Argersinger v. Hanlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29

(1972).
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criminal system who previously would have been committed civilly.
The incompetency process has become a "back-door" commitment
route. In effect, these misdemeanor incompetency-to-stand-trial commitments are short-term alternatives to civil commitment, and not
truly criminal dispositions. Following a brief period of incompetency
hospitalization, these defendants typically are released and their criminal charges dismissed. Many of these individuals do not belong in
the criminal process, and most do not belong in the hospital. They
belong in the community, but require continued services. Instead of
spending millions of dollars in the criminal system on the processing
of these misdemeanor incompetency cases, this money should go towards improving services in the community to meet the continued
medical and social needs of these individuals. By adopting the petty
offense or misdemeanor exception proposed, governments could effectuate these savings and reallocate the funds to necessary community services. Such an exception would be easy to adopt legislatively.
An amendment to state incompetency-to-stand-trial statutes or court
rules could provide that in all misdemeanor cases (or in all misdemeanor cases in which a prison sentence is ruled out), a defendant
clearly and voluntarily electing to plead guilty or nolo contendere with
the approval of counsel will be presumed to be competent to do so.
Many defendants, whether charged with a misdemeanor or a felony, will wish to stand trial rather than to plead guilty. Applying a low
standard of competency for defendants in these cases would not compromise the concerns for accuracy and for preserving the moral dignity of the criminal process. These concerns assume that allowing a
defendant with an impaired ability to understand the nature of the
proceeding and participate fully in the defense to stand trial would
skew the criminal process in favor of the prosecution. Yet, in some
cases, the defense strategy does not require the defendant's participation or understanding, and in other cases the defendant's participation does not help significantly. 10 9 Indeed, in cases in which
defendants raise an insanity defense-which many defendants whose
competency is in question do-defense counsel may want to present
those defendants to the trier of facts before they have been restored to
competency and returned to court on what may be a high dose of
psychotropic medication, that may affect the jury's assessment of their
credibility.11 0 In addition, defense counsel often will file a motion
109 See ABA TENTATIVE DRAFr, supra note 32, at 7.160; Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note
32, at 517; Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 956.
110 See Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992); Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453
N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976); In re
Pray, 336 A.2d 174 (Vt. 1975); State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1960); ABA TENTATVE
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which raises a legal defense that does not require the defendant's participation. These include motions to dismiss the indictment for lack
of a speedy trial or for violation of the ban on double jeopardy, and
motions to suppress critical evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment rights, or some other
attack on the indictment or on the admissibility of key evidence. They
also include cases in which counsel raises police or prosecutorial misconduct Deferring consideration of these legal challenges until after
the defendant has received what might be a lengthy period of confinement for incompetency treatment seems questionable in cases in
which counsel wishes to proceed and the defendant clearly and voluntarily agrees."' Concerns for accuracy or for preserving the dignity of
the criminal process cannot reasonably justify delaying the criminal
process in these cases.
Instead of a rigid bar on the trial of a defendant of questionable
competency, legislatures should adopt a more flexible, sliding-scale
approach. They should employ standards that reflect the highly contextualized nature of competency and base the degree of competency
necessary in a particular case on the precise degree of ability that a
defendant will require in that case. Especially when the consequences
to the defendant are relatively minor, and the defense strategy in the
case requires little assistance and participation by the defendant,
courts should defer to the autonomy of defendants who are clearly
able to agree to the trial strategy recommended by counsel, even if
their autonomy is reduced by mental illness. In many cases, respecting such autonomy, and permitting the case to proceed, at least provisionally, will produce just, fair, and accurate results that do not
compromise the moral dignity of the criminal process.
Only when defendants' mental illness grossly impairs their ability
to understand the choice they must make or their ability to make it
rationally, should moral dignity and reliability concerns preclude defendants from making that choice. When the defendants' impairment is not this severe, the law should respect their choice and their
counsels' concurrence for two reasons. First, while the defendants'
autonomy interests may be somewhat reduced by mental illness, their
choice nevertheless represents some degree of autonomy worthy of
DRAFr, supra note 32, at 7.245; Restructuring Competency, supranote 5, at 956.

111 InJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 741 (1972), in referring to Pate,the Court noted,
"We do not read this Court's previous decisions to preclude the States from allowing, at a
minimum, an incompetent defendant to raise certain defenses such as insufficiency of the
indictment, or to make certain pretrial motions through counsel." If such proceedings are
not barred even for a defendant adjudicated to be incompetent, then surely they would
not be barred for a defendant of questionable competency who assents to counsel's recommendation that such action be taken.

BRUCEJ. WINICK

[Vol. 85

respect. Second, counsel's advice (or concurrence) represents a professional judgment that in the context of the individual case, respecting the defendant's choice will not frustrate moral dignity and
reliability interests. Many of these defendants will acquiesce passively
in the judgement made by counsel, with the result that the attorney
will be functioning as the real decision-maker. In such cases, autonomy interests, although present, are reduced. But even apart from
autonomy concerns, counsel's decision to go forward, based on a conclusion that the client, although impaired, possesses enough competency in the circumstances, should sufficiently support a reasonable
assurance that the moral dignity and reliability concerns of the criminal justice process will not be frustrated.
C.

A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF COMPETENCY

Professor Bonnie argues that even if the protection of the incompetency doctrine should be deemed waivable, my attempt to advance
a legally satisfactory theory of waiver fails because "a defendant's ability to express a preference for adjudication does not sufficiently measure competence to waive a constitutional right."" 2 Professor Bonnie
argues that when fundamental rights like the right to counsel or to a
trial are involved, expression of a preference to waive the right is insufficient to effect a valid waiver." 3 To waive such rights, "the waiver
must 'be knowing and intelligent' and the court must assure, on the
record that these criteria have been satisfied."'1 4 The "ability to express a preference, absent any understanding of the nature of the
choice or the consequences of the decision," Bonnie argues, "is not a
5
sufficient substantive test of legal competence.""
I agree with Professor Bonnie that the mere expression of a preference cannot alone meet the requirements for competency to waive
certain fundamental constitutional rights, like the right to representation by counsel or the full range of trial rights (waived by a plea of
guilty). My proposal, however, did not suggest that expression of preference, alone, should indicate competency. Rather, it argued that the
law shall permit defendants whose competency is in question to waive
these rights when they clearly and voluntarily express a preference to
do so, provided certain other conditions are satisfied, including the
concurrence of counsel. It never suggested that the ability to express
such a preference indicates competency or that courts should permit
incompetent defendants to waive these rights. Indeed, it pointed out
112 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 544.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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that "[tjhe high value attached to the principle of individual autonomy does not mean that incompetent expressions of autonomy are or
116
should be accepted."
Determining whether an expression of preference is competent,
however, is often difficult, and a large percentage of cases could be
decided either way. It is difficult to ascertain an individual's ability to
process information and engage in rational decisionmaking. Moreover, evaluators may confuse the quality of the decisionmaking process with the reasonableness of the decision. With this in mind, my
initial article argued that courts should employ a presumption in favor
of the competency of an individual who is able to articulate a preference and whose counsel concurs with the choice made. 117 Many cases
will involve defendants on the borderline of competence. "To prevent
excessive paternalism we should presume that individuals who are
able to express a choice are competent."118 Existing practices in both
criminal and non-criminal contexts support this presumption. 119
Proposing that the law should recognize a presumption in favor
of competency in cases in which the defendant can clearly and voluntarily express a preference, is not the same as proposing that it should
consider the ability to express a preference as dispositive evidence of
competency. The ability to express a choice would not alone "satisfy
120
even the minimum substantive conception of self-determination."
When defendants base their preference on "irrelevant reasons ('I will
plead guilty because I am an insect'), irrational beliefs ('I will stand
trial and thereby become a movie star'), or outright delusions ('I am
an extraterrestrial and will return to my planet')," that choice does
not deserve respect. 121 However, "[ain individual able to express a
choice is exercising at least some autonomy, and our respect for the
principle of autonomy makes it appropriate to utilize a presumption
of competency to guide the decision-maker in such a case." 122 The
presumption of competency that is proposed here would not shield
"does
clearly incompetent expressions of choice. Such a presumption
23
not always decide a case; it is a rebuttable presumption.'
116 RestructuringCompetency, supranote 5, at 966.
117 Id at 966.
118 Id.

119 I& at 959-62 (discussing waiver in civil commitment context); id. at 963-65 (discussing practices in the contexts of competency to consent to hospitalization, to make a contract, to make a will).
120 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 544.
121 Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 967.
122 I&
see also Winick,
123 Id.;

supranote 75, at 1776 ("Only in clear cases should an individual
be deemed incompetent when he or she is able to articulate a choice."); Winick, supra
note 34, at 862 ("A presumption in favor of competency is not, of course, a conclusive
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Professor Bonnie treats the suggested presumption in favor of
competency as a substantive test of competency to waive rights, rather
than as a procedural rule concerning how such competency should be
ascertained.' 2 4 This proposal, however, contains elements of both a
substantive and a procedural rule. The law "should apply only a relatively low standard of competency and minimal scrutiny when the defendant, with the concurrence of his attorney, expresses the wish to
stand trial, and a higher standard and more intense scrutiny when the
state asserts that the defendant should be tried over his objection that
he is incompetent." 2 5 A clearly expressed choice by defendants to
resolve the charges speedily, either by trial or a guilty plea, deserves a
degree of respect that permits only limited scrutiny. A high degree of
scrutiny is appropriate, however, when the state seeks to prevent defendants from invoking their own incompetency as a shield to an immediate trial. Other than suggesting a low standard of competency
for assent and a higher standard for objection, the proposal did not
set forth a substantive definition of competency, let alone equate competency with the ability to express a preference. The discussion of the
presumption in favor of competency contained the germ of a procedural proposal for adjudicating competency-a proposal that has de126
veloped in greater detail in my more recent writings.
How would the suggested procedural presumption in favor of
competency work? Although a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption is really a substantive rule, a rebuttable presumption such as the
one contemplated is a procedural device that determines how a substantive issue will be decided. A presumption allocates (and sometimes reallocates) a burden of proof. The party challenging a
presumption has the burden of demonstrating its falsity. Moreover, a
presumption places a production burden on the party challenging it,
requiring that party to present evidence negating the presumption.
In the absence of such a showing, the presumption is unrebutted, and
the truth of the issue that is the subject of the presumption is treated
as having been established.
When reasonable doubt about competency is raised in a criminal
case, due process requires a fair determination of the issue. This is
presumption.").
124 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 544-45 & n.29.
125 RestructuringCompetency, supranote 5, at 968.
126 See Competencyfor Treatment supra note 74 (discussing presumptions of competency in
determining competency to make treatment decisions); Competencyfor Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 74 (discussing presumptions of competency to make voluntary hospitalization decisions); Winick, supranote 34 (discussing the role of presumptions of competency
and burdens of proof in judicial hearings on competency to stand trial).
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actually the holding of Pate v. Robinson12 7 and Drpe v. Missouri,12 8 two
leading Supreme Court competency-to-stand-trial cases that often are
construed as placing a total bar on trying an incompetent defendant.
The existence of reasonable doubt as to the defendant's competency
does not destroy a presumption of competency in cases where the defendant, with the advice and agreement of counsel, clearly and voluntarily expresses a preference in favor of trial or a guilty plea. 129 Even
when doubt about competency triggers an inquiry under Pate and
Drape, the presumption in favor of competency continues to inform
the adjudication of the issue by placing the burden of proving incompetency on the party challenging the presumption, which in this context would be the prosecution.' 3 0 If the prosecution fails to produce
specific evidence of the defendant's incompetency, the presumption
remains unrebutted, and the criminal proceeding may continue.1 3 1
To rebut the presumption, the prosecution must produce evidence
suggesting that the defendant's choice is the product of mental illness. The prosecution can carry this burden by adducing evidence
that suggests, for example, that the defendant's choice is the product
of pathological delusions or hallucinations, is based on beliefs that are
intrinsically irrational or on reasons that are clearly irrelevant, or is
the result of a mood disorder that impairs the defendant's judgment
or motivation to act self-interestediy1 3 2 In addition, the trial judge is
free to engage the defendant in a short colloquy that typically occurs
in connection with the acceptance of a guilty plea. 3 3 Courts can require this colloquy when the defendant seeks to plead guilty or waive
certain fundamental rights, like the right to counsel. The judge's
questioning would provide additional assurance that the defendant's
expressed preference is voluntary, that the defendant has at least a
rudimentary understanding of the nature of the right sought to be
waived, and that the defendant's decision is not the product of cognitive impairment or a mood disorder.
If the prosecution cannot produce any evidence, and the defendant's responses do not raise doubt, the presumption in favor of com127 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
128 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
129 Winick, supra note 34, at 862.
130 Id.
13 Id. at 862-63.
132 See Competency for Treatment, supra note 74, at 44 (discussing operation of presump-

tion of competency in the context of competency to consent to treatment); Restutauring
Competency, supra note 5, at 967; see alsoJeffrie Murphy, Incompetency and Paternalism,60
ARCHlv FUR REC-TS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOP-nIE 465, 473-74 (1974); Allan M. Tepper &
Amiram Elwork, Competence to Consent to Treatment as a Psycholegal Constut 8 1Aw & HUM.
BEHAV. 205, 216-18 (1984).
133 See, e.g., FED. R. CPuM. P. 11.
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petency remains unrebutted, and no further inquiry occurs. As
mentioned, courts can treat their decisions to honor a defendant's
desire to stand trial as provisional, and reconsider them as the trial
unfolds if the defendant's conduct or demeanor suggests incompetency, or if defense counsel decides to raise the issue. If at the initial
competency inquiry the prosecution comes forward with evidence suggesting that the defendant's expression of choice in favor of trial or a
guilty plea is incompetent, or if the defendant's responses to the trial
judge's inquiries raise a serious question as to the defendant's competency, the court can order a more formal competency evaluation and
hold a further hearing on the issue. In many cases, however, employing a procedural presumption of competency and placing the burden
of proof on the party challenging competency will avoid the formal
clinical evaluation of competency that now typically (and often unnecessarily) occurs.
This procedure satisfies the due process requirement of conducting an inquiry into competency when reasonable doubt is raised
about the issue. Pate v. Robinson'-' imposes a constitutional obligation
on trial judges to raise the competency issue and hold a hearing to
appraise a defendant's competency whenever sufficient evidence of
incompetency comes to their attention. Pate does not, however, specify the nature of the hearing required. Due process is a flexible notion, and does not always require a formal, trial-type hearing. Even if
the defendant appears to be mentally ill or has a history of mental
illness, an informal inquiry into competency using the presumption
proposed here meets the requirement of due process. Again, this presumption applies only in cases in which the defendant, with the advice
and concurrence of counsel, clearly expresses a preference for trial or
a guilty plea. Courts could hold a more elaborate hearing if the prosecution successfully rebuts the presumption of competency.
Although under Pate the existence of mental illness triggers the
need for an inquiry into the defendant's competency, an informal inquiry into the issue using a presumption in favor of competency in
cases in which the defendant, with the concurrence of counsel, wishes
to go forward, with a more formal inquiry held if the presumption is
rebutted, should suffice. The existence of mental illness alone, even
one of the major mental illnesses like schizophrenia, major depression, or bipolar disorder, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of
competency that should attach when a defendant can clearly express a
preference in which counsel concurs. Mental illness should not be
equated with incompetency. Many individuals suffering from serious
134

383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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mental illness retain full decisionmaking capacity, and even when
such illness impairs capacity in one area of functioning, it may leave
capacity unimpaired in others.13 5 Therefore, prosecutors should have
to show more than mental illness to rebut the presumption of competency; they should have to produce specific evidence suggesting that
the evidence influenced the defendant's decision.
An informal process utilizing a presumption in favor of competency should not promote extensive appellate litigation or collateral
attacks on defendants' guilty pleas. In cases in which the presumption
of competence is not rebutted, the colloquy between the trial judge
and the defendant suggested above should create an adequate record
to insulate the case from appeal or collateral attacks questioning competence. Insulation from subsequent attack could be further assured
if the court required counsel to state, on the record, that the defendant's decision was the subject of advice and consultation with counsel,
that it seems reasonable and to be in the client's best interests, and
that counsel believes that the defendant possesses sufficient competence to make the decision. Such a statement by counsel would not
necessarily preclude counsel from later raising the question of competency if, as the trial unfolded, counsel became convinced that the defendant's condition had changed, or that counsel's original
assessment of competency was wrong. Should counsel become convinced during trial that the defendant actually was incompetent, counsel's motion, together with a detailed recitation of the circumstances
giving rise to this change of view, should -create sufficient doubt to
36
require the trial court to hold a new inquiry into the matter.
Critics may claim that defense counsel will abuse the process by
opting for a trial to test the strength of the prosecution's case, but
preserving the ability to bail out if the case appears to be going poorly.
135 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) ("In determining whether an individual meets a specified legal

standard (e.g., for competence, criminal responsibility, or disability), additional information is usually required beyond that contained in the DSM-IV diagnosis. This might include information about the individual's functional impairments and how these
impairments affect the particular abilities in question. It is precisely because impairments,
abilities, and disabilities vary widely within each diagnostic category that assignment of a
particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or disability. Id. at xxiii."); PAUL S. APPLEBAUM & THOMAS G. GuTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 218, 220 (1991) ("The mere presence of psychosis, dementia, mental retardation,
or some other form of mental illness or disability is insufficient in itself to constitute incompetence."); Karen McKinnon et al., Clinicians Assessments of Patients' Decision Making
Capaci, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1159 (1989); StephenJ. Morse, Crazy Behavior,
Morals, and Science: An Analysis ofMental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. Rav. 527, 573,588 (1978);
Competency for Treatment, supra note 74, at 17-18; Competency for Voluntary Hospitalization,
supra note 74, at 188-90.
136 See supra notes 86 to 88 and accompanying text.
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This concern underestimates the professional ethics of the defense
bar and the ability of trial judges to police counsel appearing in their
courts. When attorneys certify that their clients seem competent and
that their client's choice to go forward seems to be in their best interest, the law should assume that counsel is acting in good faith and that
any subsequent representation to the court by counsel that the client
is incompetent also is made in good faith. Few attorneys will wish to
risk a trial judge's suspicion that they are attempting to perpetuate a
fraud on the court.
Professor Bonnie concedes that a procedural presumption in
favor of competency might be appropriate in certain contexts.' 3 7 He
suggests, however, that in the criminal context, "such a presumption
would not be normatively plausible because the underlying issue is
whether the defendant has the abilities needed for self-interested
decisionmaking." 13 8 Professor Bonnie's criticism would apply to a
conclusive presumption of competency triggered by an expression of
a preference, but not to a rebuttable presumption like the one suggested here. A rebuttable presumption does not beg the question of
the issue under consideration; it is merely a procedural device for
resolving that issue. Rather than foreclosing inquiry into the underlying question, presumptions and burdens of proof focus the issues and
structure and order the modes of their proof. Only when production
burdens are not satisfied is further inquiry into an issue precluded.
Only if the party assigned a burden of production or proof lacks a fair
opportunity to attempt to carry that burden is due process violated.
9
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Medina v. California3
clearly supports the constitutionality of the use of the presumption of
competency suggested here. The Court in Medina upheld the constitutionality of a statutory presumption in favor of the competency of a
criminal defendant and the placement of the burden of proof in an
adjudication of the issue upon the party challenging competency.
The Court's rejection of the challenge to the statutory presumption
involved there, raised by a defendant who asserted that it was constitutionally unfair to give him the burden of establishing his own incompetency, constitutes an endorsement of the constitutionality of the use
of presumptions in the competency-to-stand-trial area.
Medina'sendorsement of the constitutionality of presumptions in
favor of competency stands in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's
Bonnie, supra note 6, at 544-45.
Id. at 545 & n.29 ("In the end . . . the argument must fail because it effectively
forecloses inquiry on the competence of a person to waive legal safeguards designed to
protect incompetent defendants.").
139 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992); see Winick, supra note 34 (analyzing Medina).
137
138
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decision two years earlier in Zinermon v. Burch.140 In the course of
discussing the necessity of a procedural determination of the competency of a mental patient seeking voluntary admission to a psychiatric
hospital, the Court in Zinermon noted that, even though the state
might be justified in taking at face value a request for admission to a
hospital for medical treatment, a state "may not be justified in doing
so, without further inquiry, as to a mentally ill person's request for
admission and treatment at a mental hospital."14 ' This language
seems to reject the presumption in favor of the competency of mentally ill persons, and to call for an "inquiry" into the issue whenever a
mentally ill person seeks hospitalization. Construed broadly, the
Zinermon language might suggest the need for such an inquiry whenever a mentally ill person seeks to exercise any rights, including the
assertion or waiver of rights in the criminal process. This language,
however, was dicta, and if taken literally would undermine the institution of voluntary hospitalization and impose unintended antitherapeutic consequences on patients and serious fiscal costs on the
42
states.1
The presumption in favor of the competency of mentally ill persons, which the Zinermon dicta seems to question, has been a significant recent development in mental health law. 143 The presumption
in favor of competency constitutes a recognition that mental illness
does not necessarily produce incompetency, and frequently does not
do so.' 4 4 Moreover, it reflects a preference in favor of individual autonomy grounded in both political and legal theory and psychological
principles. 14
Although the implications of the Zinermon dicta are questionable, 146 the holding of the case-that some "inquiry" into competency
should have been made when the patient involved in that case sought
admission to a mental hospital-seems clearly correct, and illustrates
the kind of case in which a presumption in favor of competency
should be considered to have been rebutted. The patient in Zinermon
was able to express a preference for hospitalization, but appeared confused and delusional at the time, was unable to state the reasons for
his choice, and was hallucinating in a manner that affected his deci140 494 U.S. 113 (1990); see Compeencyfor Voluntary Hospitalization,supranote 74 (analyzing Zinermon).
141 494 U.S. at 133 n.18.
142 Competency for Voluntary Hospitalization, supranote 74, at 177-82, 191, 192-99.
143 See Competency for Treatment, supra note 74, at 22-23.
144 See supranote 135 and accompanying text.
145 Winick, supra note 75.
146 See Competency for Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 74.
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sion.' 47 In fact, he apparently believed that the psychiatric hospital he
was entering was "heaven."' 48 These facts certainly suggest the need
for an inquiry into competency, and would rebut any presumption in
favor of competency that would apply in this and other cases. However, absent facts such as these, suggesting that the individual's expressed choice is the product of mental illness, competency should be
presumed, and a formal inquiry into the competency question should
be unnecessary.' 49
Although the issues presented in Medina v. Californiawere quite
different from those presented in Zinermon, the Medina decision seems
to endorse a presumption in favor of competency, whereas the
Zinermmo decision had challenged it.150 California's statutory presumption in favor of competency examined in Medina represents "the
enlightened approach of modem mental health law." 15' Medina upheld the constitutionality of the California statute, and hence in no
way affects the Court's earlier holding in Zinermon. But the Court's
endorsement of the presumption in favor of competency in Medina is
a welcome step away from the questionable implications of Zinermn's
broad dicta.
Medina paves the way for adoption of the proposal made herethat a presumption of competency should attach when a defendant,
with the advice and concurrence of counsel, clearly and voluntarily
expresses a preference for trial or a guilty plea, and that unless the
prosecution can adduce specific evidence showing that the defendant's expressed preference is incompetent, or this conclusion is suggested by the defendant's own statements while engaging in a
colloquy with the trial judge, the court should accept the defendant's
waiver. By upholding the constitutionality of a statutory presumption
in favor of competency and allocation of the burden of proof on the
issue to the party asserting incompetency, Medina suggests that the
proposal advanced here would meet constitutional requirements.
Further, the reasons for adopting this presumption are compelling.
Such a procedure would further the value deeply ingrained in the
147 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 118-20.
148 Id.
149 An American Psychiatric Association Task Force Report that recently examined the
Zinemon issue concluded that the need for an inquiry into competency could be satisfied
by an informal clinical evaluation of the issue occurring at admission, and that ajudicial
hearing of the kind usually required for involuntary commitment was both unnecessary
and unwise. AmEucAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N TASK FORCE ON CONSENT TO VOLUNTARY HospiTALIZATION, CONSENT TO VOLUNTARY HOSPrrAuZATION (1993) (TASK FORCE REPORT No.

34); Bruce J. Winick, How to Handle Voluntary Hospitalization after Zinermon v. Burch, 21
ADMIN. & POL. IN MENTAL HEALTH 395 (1994).
150 See Winick, supra note 34, at 858-63.
151 Id. at 863.
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American constitutional heritage of protecting and promoting individual autonomy. 15 2 In addition, it would reduce some of the unnecessary costs of the existing incompetency process and reduce the
burdens it imposes upon defendants. Moreover, as suggested, the use
of the procedural presumption could further these interests without
sacrificing the concern for fairness and accuracy in adjudication, and
without undermining the moral dignity of the criminal process.
D.

COMPARING PROFESSOR BONNIE'S APPROACH AND AN ATrEMPTED
RECONCILIATION

In his recent analysis of competency to stand trial, Professor Bonnie criticizes the "open-textured single construct" of competency that
usually is applied. 15 3 Instead, Professor Bonnie suggests viewing competency as two related but somewhat separate constructs-a foundational concept of "competency to assist counsel," which comprises the
core constitutional meaning of competency to stand trial,' 5 4 and a
contextualized concept of "decisional competency," which relates to
the defendant's ability to make various decisions that the criminal process allows the defendant to make. 155 Competence to assist counsel,
according to Professor Bonnie, relates to the minimum conditions required for participation in the criminal process. 156 Professor Bonnie
relates these minimum components to the underlying societal justifications for the incompetency doctrine-ensuring the moral dignity of
the criminal process and the accuracy of adjudication. 15 7 Accordingly, the concept of competency to assist counsel includes the ability
to understand the nature of wrongdoing and punishment, the purpose and effect of the criminal prosecution and conviction, the role of
152 See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see generallyWinick, supranote 75.
153 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 548, 551.
154 Id.at 548, 561-67; see id.
at 562 (table 2) (setting forth components of competence to
assist counsel).
155 Id. at 548, 567-93. Professor Bonnie has identified five separate tests of decisional
competence in criminal adjudication. Ranked from lowest to highest, these tests are: (1)
Expression of Choice (ability to express a stable preference); (2) Basic Understanding
(ability to understand nature and consequences of decision); (3) Basic Rationality (ability
to express plausible (i.e., not grossly irrational) reasons for the decision); (4) Appreciation
(ability to understand reasons for alternative courses of action) (risks and benefits); and
(5) Reasoned Choice (ability to use legal processes to compare and weigh risks and benefits of alternative courses of action). Id. at 576 (Figure 1). Each category requires the
ability listed parenthetically plus the abilities listed in the earlier-numbered test. Id. Professor Bonnie's definition of decisional competence builds on the work of Professors Appelbaum and Grisso, relating to the competency of patients to engage in treatment
decisionmaking. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to
Consent to Treatment, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1635 (1988).
156 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 554.
157 Id. at 555.
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defense counsel, and the ability of defendants to relate these understandings to their own situation.1 5 8 In addition, it requires that the
defendant be able to recognize and coherently relate pertinent information. 159 This foundational requirement, according to Professor
Bonnie, does not include the ability to make decisions that may arise
160
in the criminal case or the defendant's ability to function at trial.
Thus, within Professor Bonnie's framework, a defendant who is
competent to assist counsel may not necessarily also be decisionally
competeht, i.e., may not be competent to make specific decisions in
the case. Rather than regarding these two components of competency-ability to assist counsel and decisional competence-as parts
of a single construct, Professor Bonnie prefers to regard them as separate constructs. The criminal justice system does not require a defendant to make decisions about all aspects of trial strategy. Most of
these decisions are made by the attorney. The law, however, commits
a small number of these decisions to the defendant-decisions regarding the plea, whether to waive the right to trial by jury, and
whether the defendant will be present and will testify. 16 1 These decisions are left to the defendant out of respect for individual autonomy.
Because not all criminal cases will require decisionmaking about each
of these issues, Professor Bonnie's concept of decisional competency
is highly contextualized. In Professor Bonnie's view, the foundational
ability to assist counsel is required in all cases, and defendants not
possessing this core ability should be barred from proceeding, even if
they wish to waive the incompetency doctrine. However, a lack of decisional competence should not necessarily bar adjudication. 162 Professor Bonnie's distinction between ability to assist counsel and
decisional competence is a useful one. Professor Bonnie's analysis,
like my own, is based on the belief "that formal judicial intervention
under the competence doctrine should be minimized and that correspondingly greater attention should be paid to the responsibilities and
prerogatives of defense counsel." 16 Whereas I question the bar
against adjudication if the defendant, although of questionable competence, wishes to assent (with the concurrence of counsel) to trial or
a guilty plea, Professor Bonnie accepts and endorses the bar against
158 Id. at 555, 562.

159 Id. at 555.
160 Id. at 555, 561.
161 Id. at 553 & n.57, 568-69 (Most trial decisions, including those relating to investigation, discovery, pretrial motions, and trial and appellate strategy, can be made by counsel
alone, but a limited number require the personal participation of the defendant).
162 Id. at 555-67 ("[A] finding of decisional incompetence need not bar adjudication.
Only incompetence to assist counsel bars adjudication."). Id. at 561.
165

Id. at 548.
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adjudication if the defendant lacks the foundational ability to assist
counsel.164 While these approaches are somewhat different, they seek
a common goal, and there is more agreement than disagreement.
Recognizing the extent to which the bar on adjudication of an
incompetent defendant is ingrained in constitutional theory, the proposal presented here seeks to define competency more narrowly in
cases of assent and to call for a procedural presumption in favor of
competency when a defendant clearly and voluntarily expresses such
assent with the concurrence of counsel. Other than suggesting a
lower threshold of competence for those who assent than for those
who object to the recommendation of counsel, this proposal did not
attempt to set forth a detailed definition of competence. Professor
Bonnie's work fills this gap by dividing the construct of competency
into the two components of ability to assist counsel and decisional
competence, and by providing a detailed analysis of the abilities that a
defendant should have and may need in varying contexts. This distinction is useful, and basically consistent with the theory presented
here. 165 Restating that theory using Professor Bonnie's terminology
shows how the two approaches fit together.
Most defendants able to express a preference for trial or for a
guilty plea with the advice and concurrence of counsel will satisfy Professor Bonnie's concept of foundational competency. When counsel
has recommended a course of action to a mentally impaired client,
and the client has assented to that course of action after consulting
with counsel about its likely consequences, or when that course of action is selected by the defendant with counsel's approval, counsel's
concurrence with the client's decision represents an implicit representation to the court concerning the defendant's abilities. Counsel
should not provide the necessary concurrence without believing that
the defendant possesses at least the minimal requirements necessary
for understanding the proceedings, communicating relevant information to counsel, and making a decision that is reasonable in the circumstances and is not a product of delusion or gross irrationality. It is
unlikely that a defense attorney having serious doubts about the defendant's ability to assist counsel would provide the concurrence that
this proposal contemplates as a necessary condition for triggering the
presumption in favor of competency. In this sense, an attorney providing concurrence with the defendant's choice is determining that
the defendant possesses what Professor Bonnie refers to as the foundational ability to assist counsel.
164

Id.

165 See supra notes 116 to 125 and accompanying text.
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Defendants unable to meet Professor Bonnie's criteria for ability
to assist counsel, therefore, should not receive the concurrence of
counsel to proceed or to plead guilty. When the defendant expresses
a preference for trial or a guilty plea, and counsel does not concur,
believing that the defendant is incompetent to make the decision, it is
likely that the court will find the defendant incompetent. 166 In this
situation, the court will permit the defendant to proceed only if a formal competency evaluation concludes that the defendant is competent. If, on the other hand, counsel concurs with the defendant's
expressed decision, the client's ability clearly and voluntarily to express that decision together with counsel's concurrence will support a
presumption that the defendant is able to assist counsel in Professor
Bonnie's sense. Doubts concerning the defendant's abilities in this
regard, raised either by the prosecution or by the defendant's own
responses to the court's inquiries, may be sufficient to destroy the presumption. In such a case, the court must conduct an inquiry into
competency, including clinical evaluation when needed. Following
this further inquiry, the defendant will be found either competent or
incompetent.
If the presumption in favor of competency is not rebutted, the
court will deem the defendant competent to plead guilty. Defendants
wishing to plead not guilty will be deemed provisionally competent to
stand trial. If the defendant is found provisionally competent because
the procedural presumption in favor of competency is not rebutted, a
further presumption, that the defendant is decisionally competent in
Professor Bonnie's sense, is appropriate. To protect the moral dignity
of the criminal process and avoid an unacceptable risk of unreliable
conviction, Professor Bonnie would categorically bar the adjudication
of a case involving a defendant who is unable to assist counsel. Once
the defendant meets this standard, however, Professor Bonnie would
permit "more flexible responses, such as surrogate decisionmaking or
specifically tailored default rules" when a defendant, although able to
16 7
assist counsel, lacks decisional competence in certain respects.
When the defendant's lack of decisional competence (measured
under a relatively undemanding standard when the defendant assents
to counsel's recommendation) affects decisions regarding issues tradi166 The likelihood that the court will find the defendant incompetent in this situation
exists under present practices. However, if my proposals are adopted, there probably
would not be a need in this situation for the court to find the defendant incompetent.
Rather, counsel simply would seek the incompetency continuance suggested in section III
E, infra.
167 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 557; see also id. at 561 ("[A] finding of decisional incompetence need not bar adjudication. Only incompetence to assist counsel bars
adjudication.").

1995]

REFORMING .INCOMPETENCYTO STAND TRIAL

609

tionally treated as non-waivable, except through the voluntary and
knowing consent of the defendant-such as a plea of guilty and waiver
ofjury trial-Professor Bonnie would allow a degree of surrogate decisionmaking by counsel. For decisionmaking about jury trial, if the defendant is decisionally incompetent, Professor Bonnie would allow the
attorney to make the decision. 68 For decisionmaking about how to
plead, if the defendant is decisionally incompetent, Professor Bonnie
would allow the attorney to plead the defendant not guilty and obtain
a trial, but would not permit a plea of guilty. 169 In addition, in certain
circumstances in which the attorney and client disagree with regard to
a particular decision, and in which the defendant lacks decisional
competence (as measured under a more demanding standard), Professor Bonnie would allow surrogate decisionmaking (except for pleas
of guilty).170 With respect to other decisions, when client and counsel
are in agreement, the defendant's lack of decisional competence
be permitted to make the
would not bar trial; rather, counsel would
7
decision as surrogate decision-maker.' '
The approach presented here differs only somewhat from Professor Bonnie's with respect to the treatment of defendants with potential decisional incompetence. If the presumption in favor of
competency recommended here remains unrebutted, the defendant
is presumed to have both competence to assist counsel and decisional
competence. 172 This would permit a plea of guilty, and during trial,
would permit the defendant to make strategic choices with counsel.
The defendant and counsel would discuss whether the defendant
should waive jury trial, testify, or raise certain affirmative defenses,
such as an insanity defense. If the defendant expresses a preference
with regard to those issues, this preference would be presumed to be
competent if it is in accordance with counsel's recommendation or
counsel concurs in the decision. If counsel believes the defendant's
assent is without sufficient understanding of the circumstances, or is
the product of mental illness, counsel should not concur. The ultimate decision, however, is left to the attorney, who is always subject to
a potential claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 173 There should
168 Id. at 582-86.
169 Id.

170 Id. at 579-80, 586-87.
171 Id. at 545-46, 557, 577, 586.

172 Whether decisional competence can be presumed in cases in which defendants are
competent to assist counsel is, of course, an empirical question for which there is presently
no available data. Empirical research on this issue would therefore be helpful.
173 In leaving the bulk of competency decisionmaking in the hands of defense counsel,
both Professor Bonnie and I assume that counsel is competent and will zealously safeguard
the defendant's interests. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of
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be little reason to inquire into a defendant's competence to make
most decisions. Only in the case of decisions usually requiring judicial
inquiry, such as a decision to waive counsel or ajuy trial, would the
court need independently to ascertain the defendant's competency.
Thus, both Professor Bonnie and I would leave the matter of
whether the defendant possesses sufficient competence largely to the
judgment of counsel. A lower threshold of competence should be
used for defendants who assent to counsel's recommendation than for
those that object. When the defendant objects to counsel's recommendation concerning a matter on which the law requires a personal
decision by the defendant-such as waiver ofjury trial or the decision
to testify or to decline to do so-counsel should honor that preference unless the defendant is highly incompetent. If counsel believes
the client is competent, counsel must defer to the defendant's preference on an issue that the law leaves to the defendant, and probably
also should defer to the client on many other issues. If, on the other
hand, counsel believes the client is incompetent, counsel should
either seek the treatment continuance described in the next subsection or raise the competency issue, in which case the court would then
conduct an inquiry into the matter. When defendants are able to express clearly and voluntarily their assent to a decision, however, counsel's concurrence constitutes an implicit representation that the client
is sufficiently competent to make the decision.
counsel. However, the quality of the criminal defense bar is varied, and in some areas, the
promise of the Sixth Amendment remains unfulfilled. Many criminal attorneys are talented, energetic advocates who effectively represent their clients' interests. Sadly, however, some are not. Some suffer under case loads too heavy to devote sufficient time to a
particular case. Some are incompetent, and some even are unethical.
Leaving incompetency decisionmaking largely in the hands of counsel thus raises certain risks. These risks increase in cases involving mentally ill defendants, because such
clients are particularly vulnerable to malpractice by counsel. Notwithstanding these risks,
in designing legal rules it seems sensible in general to make the assumption that defense
attorneys are competent and will vigorously represent their clients' interests. To minimize
this risk, a trial court should be particularly sensitive to the possibility of ineffectiveness of
counsel, and when appropriate, should question counsel to insure that the defendant's
interests are properly represented. Counsel for an impaired client bears a special degree
of professional responsibility. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rules 1.3, 1.14
(1983). A court must be especially alert to the potential breakdown in the adversary system
when defense counsel is ineffective in representing a mentally ill defendant. See Winick,
supranote 34, at 842-43. Although in general, the trial court should leave the competency
question to counsel, when the court has concerns in this area, it would be appropriate to
inquire of counsel whether the defendant's mental condition has been fully considered by
counsel, and whether counsel has had the opportunity to consult with a defense clinician
concerning the question. See Bonnie, supra note 6, at 578. As Professor Bonnie points out,
there is "a problem of quality assurance" in this area, but "[i]f attention to 'competence'
should be enhanced in this context, it should be directed toward the competence of counsel, not the competence of the defendant." Id.
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Unless the prosecution produces evidence suggesting a lack of
competence to engage in decisionmaking concerning one of these
crucial issues, or unless the court's own colloquy with the defendant
produces statements by the defendant suggesting a lack of decisional
competence, no further inquiry, should occur. With regard to decisions that do not require a defendant's personal decision-the myriad
tactical and evidentiary decisions that arise at the pretrial and at the
trial stages-both Professor Bonnie and I would allow counsel to act
on behalf of a client even when competence to engage in rational
decisionmaking is in doubt.
Although Professor Bonnie and I disagree in certain respects, our
approaches are more similar than dissimilar. This Article has shown
how to apply the use of the procedural presumption in favor of competency in the assessment of both the ability to assist counsel and to
decisional competence. Both approaches shift much of the competency determination process from the formal judicial arena to the attorney-client relationship. Rather than having extensive clinical
evaluation of competence followed byjudicial determination, the bulk
of the competency determination instead would occur within the professional relationship. Counsel would always remain free to obtain a
clinical consultation as part of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel,1 7 4 or could always consult another attorney to help in the decisionmaking process. However, leaving the bulk of competency assessment to the attorney-client
relationship should produce fair decisions that do not conflict with
the societal purposes underlying the competency doctrine. The ability of the prosecutor to adduce specific evidence of incompetency, or
of the court to conduct its own inquiry of the defendant during an incourt colloquy, provide additional assurance that leaving much of the
decisionmaking in this area to the attorney-client relationship will not
undermine the moral dignity of the criminal process or the accuracy
of adjudication.
My original proposal drew heavily on an analogy between the attorney-client relationship and the doctor-patient relationship. In the
context of competency to make treatment and hospitalization decisions, clinicians typically are trusted to make their own assessments of
their patients' competency, at least in cases of patient assent to interventions recommended by the physician. 175 Attorneys, like physicians, have a fiduciary relationship with their clients. Both attorneys
174 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
175 See generally Competency for Treatmen supranote 74, at 27-28, 81-38; Competencyfor Voluntary Hospitalization,supranote 74, at 180.

BRUCEJ.WNICK

612

[Vol. 85

and physicians have a professional duty to promote and protect the
best interests of their clients. Moreover, like physicians, attorneys are
best situated to understand their clients' cases, and therefore to assess
competence.
Competence to stand trial is fundamentally a legal question. A
lawyer is better able than a clinical evaluator to determine whether a
client possesses the skills needed to participate in a criminal trial.
Moreover, the lawyer is in the best position to understand the skills
that will be needed in the context of a particular case. The special
constitutional obligation that the Sixth Amendment places on attorneys to provide effective assistance of counsel to their clients "entails a
wide sphere of discretion to define and implement the strategic objectives of the defense."1 76 The Sixth Amendment also should insulate
the attorney-client relationship from undue prosecutorial or judicial
77
inquiry.'
My initial article proposed as an alternative to allowing a defendant of questionable competency to waive the protections of the incompetency doctrine, that counsel should be able to "waive" the doctrine
on the defendant's behalf as long as the client assents. The concept
of "waiver," however, seems awkward in this context. Counsel may
waive a variety of trial-related rights through action or inaction,
thereby binding the client whether or not the client participated in
the decision.178 However, there are several critical constitutional
rights that, under existing constitutional and ethical theory, require
the client's own voluntary and knowing waiver. These include the
right to plead guilty, the decision whether to have ajury trial, and the
decision whether to testify. 1 79 Because permitting an attorney to waive
these rights would conflict with deeply ingrained principles, Professor
Bonnie rejects an across-the-board waiver theory. 8 0° However, he
agrees that "surrogate decisionmaking by the attorney provides an attractive possibility in some contexts.' 8 ' Although an attorney should
not be permitted to plead guilty on behalf of a client, Professor Bonnie agrees that surrogate decisionmaking by the attorney should be
permitted with regard to certain issues in cases that involve trials.182
I accept Professor Bonnie's criticism that "waiver" by the attorney
of certain fundamental rights would be inconsistent with accepted
176 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 565 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-90
(1984)).
177 Id.
178 See Restructuring Competeny, supra note 5, at 959-60.

Bonnie, supranote 6, at 54547; Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 959 n.181.
180 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 545.
179

181 Id.
182

Id. at 545-47, 557, 561, 577,582-87; see supranotes 168 to 171 and accompanying text.
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doctrine, and that it is unlikely that courts will adopt a general waiverby-counsel rule. Perhaps my proposal was too broad in this regard,
-and I now recede from it. But these instances aside, virtually all of the
rights and strategic options that a defendant enjoys may be waived by
counsel. For those that are not so waiveable, allowing counsel as surrogate decision-maker to make the decision in certain circumstances,
as Professor Bonnie suggests, achieves the same result. Therefore,
Professor Bonnie's attempt to resurrect the waiver theory as a surrogate decisionmaking approach for many of the issues that arise in
cases that are resolved by trial deserves applause.
Both Professor Bonnie and I disagree with the current requirement that attorneys and courts initiate an inquiry into competency
whenever they harbor a good faith doubt as to the defendant's competence. 183 Thisjudgment should be left largely in the hands of defense
counsel.184 The current requirement restricts a lawyer's ability to protect and promote the best interests of the client. This restriction erodes client trust and confidence in counsel and impairs the ability of
counsel to function effectively. Placing counsel in such a position undermines the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is constitution85
ally suspect.'
My original proposal addressed waiver in this context, arguing
that counsel should be permitted to eschew the competency question
when both counsel and client concluded that resolution of the criminal charges would be better for the defendant than an incompetency
adjudication. Professor Bonnie grounds his acceptance of this approach in a slightly different premise-that the attorney is in the best
position to decide whether an inquiry into competency should be undertaken.' 8 6 Although I adhere to my waiver theory with regard to
most rights and strategic options, I accept Professor Bonnie's attempt
to reconceptualize the premises supporting my original proposal.
Both approaches would relax the requirement that counsel initiate a formal competency inquiry whenever there is doubt about the
183 ABRA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL H.LTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2 (1989); Bonnie, supra
note 6, at 546, 564. For discussion of the current requirement and the ethical dilemma it
creates for counsel, see Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 32; RodneyJ. Uphoff, The Role of
the CriminalDefense Lawyer in Representingthe Mentally ImpairedDefendant: Zealous Advocate or
Officer of the Court?, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 65.
184 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 546, 564.
185 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324 n.17 (1981) ("Our adversary system
functions best when a lawyer enjoys the whole-hearted confidence of his client."); ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.1 commentary, at 4-29 (2d ed. 1980) ("Nothing is
more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the establishment of trust and
confidence.").
186 Bonnie, supranote 6, at 546.
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defendant's competence and would leave the judgment as to competency to the attorney and the client. This would eliminate many unnecessary formal judicial determinations of competency. It also would
avoid much unnecessary clinical evaluation, and thereby allow a reallocation of scarce clinical resources from evaluation to treatment.
Furthermore, it would reduce many of the costs and burdens imposed
by existing practices. When a defendant of questionable competency
is willing voluntarily to assent to counsel's recommendation concerning a defense strategy, the court should respect those wishes. Both
allowing a measure of surrogate decisionmaking by counsel and instituting a presumption in favor of competency in cases of assent provide
greater deference to the autonomy both of the individual and of the
attorney-client relationship consistent with the protective objectives
and societal concerns underlying the incompetency doctrine.
My original proposal suggested that under appropriate safeguards, courts should permit defendants of questionable competency
to waive the "benefits" of the incompetency doctrine. However, under
Pate v. Robinson, incompetent defendants may not waive their rights.
To avoid this dilemma, the law should recognize a presumption that
would eliminate further inquiry into whether a mentally impaired defendant actually was incompetent in cases in which the defendant assented to a recommendation of counsel in favor of trial or a guilty
plea. Use of a procedural presumption would not violate the Court's
holding that a fair procedural determination of the competency issue
187
occur whenever reasonable doubt as to competency is raised.
Although this presumption might permit waiver by some defendants
presumed competent who actually are incompetent, Medina v. California shows that a procedural rule governing the determination of criminal competency is not unconstitutional, even though it fails to
eliminate the possibility of error in the application of the incompe188
tency test.
States are reluctant to experiment in areas that seem settled by
constitutional doctrine, particularly when the results might place
criminal convictions and guilty pleas in jeopardy. Therefore, the proposed restructuring of the incompetency doctrine will take time. The
proposal was designed to stimulate radical rethinking about the incompetency doctrine, and a period of scholarly analysis and debate is
a necessary predicate to law reform.
Therefore, Professor Bonnie's critique of the proposal, and his
187 See supra notes 127, 134 and accompanying text.
188 See Winick, supra note 34, at 843-45. The Court rejected the contrary assertion that

Justice Blackmun made in his dissent. Medina, 112 S. CL at 2583.
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own attempt to reshape it are welcome. Professor Bonnie's attempt to
differentiate the client's ability to assist counsel from that client's decisional competence is useful. His examination of attorney-client interactions in the areas in which the defendant's decisional competence
may be at issue is also useful. Professor Bonnie's work is part of an
ongoing research program supported by theJohn D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Mental Health and the
Law, which includes the development of new competency assessment
instruments and much needed empirical research on the extent to
which a defendant's abilities in one area predicts the existence of
needed abilities in another. 8 9 Professor Bonnie's useful criticisms
and his proposed approach have led to the expansion and refinement
set forth in this Article. Professor Bonnie is on the same journey, and
although his path is somewhat different, his destination is the same.
Hopefully, this scholarly dialogue will continue, and further empirical
and theoretical work will investigate the questions it raises.
E.

SUBSTITUTING A SYSTEM OF TRIAL "TREATMENT CONTINUANCES" FOR
THE FORMAL INCOMPETENCY PROCESS IN CASES INVOLVING
DEFENDANTS WHO ASSERT THEIR INCOMPETENCY AS A BAR
TO TRIAL

There should be no constitutional impediment to replacing the
competency evaluation process with a system of trial continuances.
Cases in which defendants seek to waive the incompetency doctrine
and stand trial or plead guilty over an objection by the prosecution
that they are incompetent represent only a small percentage of total
cases. In the overwhelming majority of cases, it is the defendants,
through their counsel, who raise the incompetency question as a bar
to trial. Under existing practices, a formal competency evaluation is
triggered by the defendant's request.
Instead of invoking the formal evaluation process in such cases,
courts could grant a continuance of reasonable duration to the defendant based on the assertion of counsel that the defendant is incompetent. 9 0 This would require attorneys to certify that they seek
the continuance in good faith and on reasonable grounds and to set
189 Bonnie, supranote 6, at 580 & n.188 (cting Steven K Hoge et al., THE MACARTHUR
FOUNDATION REsEARcH NErwORK ON MENrAL HEALTH AND THE LAw, PRELIMINARY REPORT,

THE MACARTHUR STRucruRmi ASSESSMENr OF COMPETENCES OF CRiMINAL DEFENDANTS,

Feb-

ruary 21, 1992).

190 Restructuring Competeny, supra note 5, at 979-88. Psychiatrist Thomas Szasz and
Professors Burt and Morris previously have advanced variations of this continuance proposal. See THOMAs S. SzAsz, PSYCHATRC JusTICE 261 (1965); Burt & Morris, supranote 88, at
81, 93-95.
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forth the specific statements by the defendant that form the basis for
the request. Counsel would have to support a request for a further
continuance with a statement from a clinician certifying that the defendant was incompetent, stating that the defendant was receiving appropriate treatment, and predicting a restoration of the defendant's
competence within a reasonable period. 19 ' The clinician's statement
could also be required to include a specific treatment plan, detailing
the kinds of treatment attempted and proposed. Defendants would
get substantial choice in electing the type of treatment to improve
their trial functioning. The place of treatment would depend on the
defendant's bail status. If in custody, such treatment would be administered either in ajail or in a security mental health facility; if released,
it would be administered in the community as an outpatient or voluntary inpatient. Defendants would bear the cost of treatment if not in
custody, unless they were indigent.
In addition to avoiding the cost of unnecessary clinical evaluation
and formal judicial determination of the defendant's competency,
this proposal could have considerable therapeutic advantages for the
1 92
defendant. Based on the literature on the psychology of choice,
the potential for successful treatment of defendants who are incompetent to stand trial is increased when the defendant accepts treatment
voluntarily rather than when the defendant is coerced to enter a forensic facility. 193 Thus, placing the burden on the defendant (and
counsel) to arrange for treatment with a provider of choice as a condition for receiving the requested continuance is both efficient and
therapeutic. With active treatment, particularly treatment the defendant seeks to obtain, the great majority of mentally impaired defendcompetency to participate in trial within
ants will gain sufficient 94
1
months.
or
several weeks
Whereas, under existing practice, an incompetency determination suspends the criminal proceedings, the treatment continuance
proposed here need not do so. During the continuance, the court
could require the defense attorney to file any pretrial motions that
191 Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 979.
192 The literature on the psychology of choice and its implications for the efficacy of
treatment in a number of differing contexts is explored in Competeny for Treatment, supra
note 74, at 46-53; Competency for Voluntary Hospitalization,supra note 74, at 192-99; Winick,
supra note 75, at 1755-68; Winick, supra note 76, at 100-11.
193 WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 73, at 315; RestructuringCompetency, supranote 5, at 980
& n.272; see generally David B. Wexler, Health Care CompliancePrinciplesand the Insanity Acquittee ConditionalRelease Process, 27 CGaM. L. BuLL. 18 (1991); Winick, supra note 75, at
1255-68; Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A TherapeuticJurisprudence Analysis, 17 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHiATRY 99 (1994).
194 Id. at 980.
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can be resolved without the client's assistance.1 9 5 Although the grant
of a treatment continuance would suspend the defendant's right to a
speedy trial, this scheme would permit defense counsel to file, at any
time, a notice with the court that the defendant has become competent. Afterwards, proceedings should resume, with speedy trial periods again running.
Requiring certificates from counsel and fromi a clinician as conditions for the grant or renewal of a continuance, coupled with judicial
supervision, should prevent abuse of the treatment continuance process. The trial judge maintains wide discretion over whether to grant
or deny requested continuances, 19 6 and the judge could condition
granting of a treatment continuance on receipt of weekly or monthly
reports from the defendant's attorney or the treating clinician or
both. The court would always be able to order an independent
clinical evaluation or court-supervised treatment if necessary. The
prosecutors would also monitor the process and could always move for
a formal competency evaluation if they suspected abuse of the contin97
uance process.'
The proposal that a defendant voluntarily accept treatment as a
condition for the grant of a trial continuance could be joined with a
form of "wagering" or behavioral contracting. 198 Under this proposal,
to increase the efficacy of treatment, the defendant and the trial court
could enter into a contingency contract under which the defendant
would receive the continuance sought in exchange for an agreement
to participate in an appropriate treatment program and for progressing toward the goal of restoration to competency, perhaps based on a
specified schedule of target goals and dates, culminating in a restoration to competency within a period specified in the contract. Jurisdictions could increase the incentive to perform effectively in treatment
by denying the defendant credit against any ultimate sentence received for time spent in incompetency commitment unless the defendant makes a substantial effort. 99 In such jurisdictions, a credit
against sentence could be used as a reinforcer in the contingency con195 SeeJackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 741 (1972) (suggesting that states may permit
such motions even during the time defendant is incompetent).
196 See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983); RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at
980.
197 Id. at 981. In the alternative, the court could refer the continuance request to a
special master or to a special program staffed by clinically trained attorneys assisting the
court. Id. at 981-83.
198 WExLER & Wn'CaK, supra note 73, at 315-16; see Wexler, supra note 193; Bruce J.
Winick, Harnessing The Power Of The Bet: Wagering with the Government as a Mechanism for
Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MwaM L. Ra. 737 (1991).
199 See RestructuringOmpetency, supra note 5, at 947.
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tract to induce an expeditious restoration to competency. 2 00
Substituting a system of trial continuances for the existing formal
incompetency process also would have the salutary effect of avoiding
unnecessary incompetency labeling. As indicated, the term "incompetency to stand trial" has an unfortunate global and permanent connotation, implying an immutable impairment, rather than a temporary
difficulty that in most cases is easily remedied. 2 0 The harmful psychological effects of using an incompetency label can be avoided by granting a "treatment continuance," a label that has no similar negative
connotations. Even when it is necessary to make a formal incompetency determination, for example when defendants seek to waive a
right that they are determined to be incompetent to waive, they could
be found "temporarily impaired" or "temporarily unable to waive" the
right in question. 20 2 Such a label suggests hope rather than hopelessness, and encourages individuals to view their problem as one that
appropriate treatment can resolve. Such a redesigned label would be
less stigmatizing to defendants and would limit the risk that individuals might interpret their impairment as global and relatively stable, an
attribution that would increase the likelihood of learned helplessness
and other inhibitory patterns that interfere with a return to
20 3
competency.
F.

DEFINING AND EVALUATING COMPETENCY IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS

The Supreme Court adopted its classic formulation of the standard for incompetency in the criminal process in the 1960 case of
Dusky v. United States.20 4 The Court held that a court was required to
determine whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to
supra note 73, at 316.
201 See supra note 59 and accompanying text; Sales & Kahle, supra note 59, at 394.
202 Winick, supra note 59, at nn.181-82. Sales and Kahle have suggested the term "un200 WEXLER & WINICK,

able to stand trial" as "less laden with unnecessary trait-like and permanent implications
because unable people often later become able." Sales & Kahle, supra note 59, at 394.
203 Winick, supranote 59. See also supranotes 183 to 184 and accompanying text. Even if
the incompetency-to-stand-trial label is not changed as suggested here, counsel can play an
important role in minimizing the antitherapeutic impact of such labeling. Counsel can
interpret the label for their clients in a way that suggests that it largely is a vehicle for
obtaining an advantageous postponement of the trial, that it will give them the opportunity
to obtain needed treatment that will increase their functioning and relieve their suffering,
and that their ability to participate in the trial that ultimately will be held will be enhanced
as a result, as will the potential for a more favorable outcome. See supra note 188 and
accompanying text; see also Keri A. Gould, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand the Arraignment Proces: A Defense Attorney's Dilemma TWether to Request a Competency Evaluation, in MENTAL
HEALTH LAW AND PRAcrGME THROUGH THE LiFE CycL E (Simon Verdun-Jones & Monique
Layton eds., 1994).
204 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). All jurisdictions follow Dusky, although statutory terminology varies widely. RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at 923 & n.4.
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consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."2 05 Although some courts had
applied a more demanding standard of competency when a defendant attempted to plead guilty or waive counsel (requiring the ability to
make a reasoned choice), in Godinez v. Moras 2 0 6 the Supreme Court
recently rejected such a higher standard. Instead, the Court found
that the Dusky formulation was the appropriate test of competency
throughout the criminal process. 20 7 The Dusky standard emphasizes
the ability of a defendant to understand and consult, not necessarily
the ability to engage in rational decisionmaking. In Godinez, the
Court distinguished between competency and the knowledge and voluntariness required for the waiver of certain fundamental rights.2 0 8 A
competency inquiry, the Court noted, focuses on the defendant's
"mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings." 20 9 By contrast, the Court noted, the inquiry
into "knowing and voluntary... is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a
210
particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced."
Although the Court thus indicated that its competency standard
was not as broad as some courts had thought, the standard is still quite
broad, open-textured, and vague, permitting clinical evaluators substantial latitude in interpreting and applying the test. 21 1 The clinical

instruments available for competency assessment compound the problem. 2 12 These'instruments typically list the many potentially relevant
capacities that a defendant might need without indicating which are
most important

2 13

Moreover, because clinical evaluators rarely con-

sult with counsel to ascertain the particular skills the defendant will
need to function effectively in a particular case, the assessment instruments, by listing a broad range of abilities, encourage clinical evaluators to apply a generalized, abstract standard of competency, rather
than a more appropriate, contextualized approach to competency as205
206
207

208
209

Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
Id.at 2686.

Id. at 2687.
Id. at 2687 n.12 (citingDrope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 171) ("(D]efendant is incompe-

tent if he 'lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against

him.'") Id. (emphasis added by Godinez Court).
Id. (citations omitted).
See Bonnie, supranote 6, at 549-50; RestructuringCompetenc, supra note 5, at 982-83.
212 See THOMAS GRisso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 78-104 (1986) (discussing
instruments).
213 Bonnie, supranote 6, at 549.
210
211
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sessment.2 14 By simply relying upon clinical judgment based upon all
the circumstances, these instruments make competency assessment a
highly discretionary exercise in clinical judgment.2 1 5 In addition,
many clinical evaluators are paternalistically oriented, and, without
more concrete guidance, tend to classify marginally competent
mental patients as incompetent. 21 6 The literature documents the tendency of clinical evaluations in the criminal courts to misunderstand
the legal issues involved in incompetency, frequently confusing it with
legal insanity or with the clinical definition of psychosis. 2 17 Some clinicians over-diagnose incompetency to brifg about what seems to
them a more humane disposition of the case, or to secure mental
health treatment because they assume it will be helpful. 21 8 The discretion vested in clinical evaluators is made more troubling by the fact
that appellate courts rarely review, and almost never reverse, trial
court competency determinations, 21 9 and the fact that trial judges al220
most always defer to clinical evaluators.
Thus, decisionmaking in this area is effectively delegated to
clinical evaluators making low visibility and essentially unreviewed decisions pursuant to a vague, open-textured standard. This arrangement allows for an obscuring of the distinction between the clinical
and legal components of incompetency, and allows clinicians to regard a competency assessment as largely an exercise in clinical description. Assessing competency, however, involves cultural, social,
political, and legal judgments which are more normative in nature
than clinical. 22 1 The essentially legal nature of the concept of competency in the criminal process calls for courts and legislatures to define
competency with greater precision. Moreover, a narrow definition of
competency should result in classifying marginally competent defend214 See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HE.m STANDARDs § 7.41 commentary at 175
(1989); GRisso, supra note 212, at 76-77; MELTON ET AL., supra note 49, at 12; ROESCH &
GOLDING, supranote 32, at 10-13.
215 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 549.
216 See Restructuring Competency, supra note 5, at 982-83.
217 RestructuringCompetency, supra note 5, at 982 (citing studies).
218 Id. at 983.
219 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 549.
220 See id. at 550; Steven L Golding et al., Assessment and Conceptualizationof Competeny to
Stand Trial: PreliminaryData on the InterdisciplinaryFitness Interview, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.

121 (1984); Steven D. Hart & Robert D. Hare, PredictingFitness To Stand TriaL The Relative
Power of Demographic, Criminal and Clinical Variables, 5 FORENSIC REP. 53, 56, 59 (1992);
James H. Reich & Linda Tookey, DisagreementsBetween Courtand Psychiatriston Competeny to
Stand Trial, 47 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 29, 30 (1986).
221 See GRisso, supra note 212, at 30; RestructuringCompetency, supranote 5, at 966; see also
Competency for Treatment, supra note 74, at 25-26 (discussing assessments of competency to

consent to treatment).
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ants as competent rather than as incompetent 2 22 In defining competency to stand trial, the law should not require of defendants suffering
from mental illness unreasonably high decisionmaking abilities that
many "normal" criminal defendants do not possess.2 23 For this reason, Professor Bonnie's efforts to delineate in detail the various components of competency to stand trial deserves applause.2 24 Moreover,
his efforts and the efforts of his co-researchers in the MacArthur Network on Mental Health and the Law to develop more detailed assessment instruments and to conduct empirical research on the
decisionmaking abilities of both "normal" and mentally ill defendants
will be most useful.
As suggested, the definition of competency should vary depending on whether the defendant assents or objects to a recommendation
made by counsel. Assent to counsel's recommendation provides an
assurance that the defendant's choice is reasonable and likely. to be in
the defendant's best interests. Erring on the side of finding a marginally competent assenting defendant to be competent, therefore, will
not undermine the societal interests in accuracy and the moral dignity
of the criminal process. When the defendant objects to counsel's recommendation, the assurance that the defendant's choice is reasonable is absent, and the societal concerns justify a higher degree of
scrutiny of the defendant's competency.
Professor Bonnie agrees that the legal test for competency should
differ according to whether the defendant assents or objects to counsel's recommendation.2 25 Furthermore, his analysis of incompetency
decisionmaking in the context of decisions whether to raise an insanity defense has demonstrated that such a differential standard accurately describes existing practice.2 26 Professor Bonnie found that
when the defendant pleads insanity in accordance with counsel's recommendation, courts, in practice, use a "basic understanding" test of
competency, in which capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the decision suffices. 227 When defendants refuse a recom222

Winick, supra note 62, at 850-52.

223 See RestructuringCompetency, supranote 5, at 970-75. Michael Perlin's concept of "san-

ism" may help to explain this differential approach. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Competency,
Deinstitutionalization,and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,28 Hous. L.Ray. 63, 91-93
(1991); Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism,'46 S.M.U. L. Rv. 373 (1992); Michael L. Perlin,
Pretexts and Mental DisabilityLaw: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MmAMi L.REv. 625 (1993);
Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of
MentalDisability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 47 (1993).
224 See Bonnie, supra note 6.
225 Id. at 576.
226 Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of CriminalDefendants: A TheoreticalReformulation,

10 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 291, 309-11 (1992); Bonnie, supranote 6, at 576-77.
227 Bonnie, supra note 6, at 576-77.
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mended insanity plea, however, and the defense attorney raises
doubts about competency, a higher test of competency is applied. 228
Finally, Professor Bonnie found that when the defendant is deemed
competent to stand trial, although not decisionally competent to
waive the insanity plea, surrogate decisionmaking on the issue, usually
29
by counsel, is permitted.2
Professor Bonnie recommends a two-level test for decisional competence based on whether the defendant assents to or objects to counsel's advice. In general, he suggests that only a basic understanding
test of competency should be required for decisions (including those
waiving constitutional rights) in which the defendant assents to counsel's recommendation. 230 Under this low-level test, only the ability to
express a choice and to understand its nature and consequences
would be required, and deficits or impairments bearing on the defendant's reasons for accepting counsel's recommendation would not
be the subject of inquiry.2 31 When, however, the defendant insists on

acting contrary to counsel's advice in a manner that raises doubts
about competency, Professor Bonnie suggests that the test should require the ability to make a reasoned choice. 23 2 This is a more stringent test that requires appreciation and the ability to engage in
rational decisionmaking.
Professor Bonnie's approach attempts to define both the lower
standard of competency in cases of assent to counsel's recommendation and a higher standard in cases of objection. The results of his
further work with the MacArthur Network on Mental Health and the
Law to operationalize these standards in assessment instruments and
to test their administration are eagerly awaited. Although the
Supreme Court in Godinez refused to depart from the unitary standard
of competency identified in Dusky, it declined to do so on constitutional grounds. Thus, the states must accept the Dusky standard as a
constitutional minimum, but they are free to go beyond it and fashion
differing tests of competency for different contexts, including recognizing a distinction between assent and objection. Hopefully, Professor Bonnie's work in this area will provoke further scholarly debate
about such differing standards, and the states ultimately will go beyond Dusky in this regard.

228 Id. at 577.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.

232 Id. at 586-87.
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CONCLUSION

This Article has recommended a restructured incompetency process that recognizes a distinction between assent and objection and
that presumes competency in cases in which the defendant assents to
counsel's recommendation, or in which counsel approves the defendant's choice. It has further recommended the use of certifications by
counsel, both in cases in which such a presumption is applied, and in
those in which defendants seek to raise their mental impairment as a
bar to trial and counsel seeks a "treatment continuance." These recommendations will subsume the bulk of the competency determination process within the attorney-client relationship. This is preferable
to the present process, in which almost all determinations go through
a formal judicial process that relies heavily upon often unnecessary
clinical evaluations. The proposal presented here leaves many decisions about competency to counsel, a professional with a fiduciary
duty to act in the defendant's best interests, and who is best situated to
ascertain the client's deficits and their impact upon the skills needed
to participate in the criminal case at hand. When necessary, of
course, counsel will have access to clinical assistance in making these
decisions, but in most cases, the decision will be left to counsel.
Moving competency determinations from clinicians to defense attorneys should increase the accuracy of competency decisionmaking,
particularly in light of the tendency of clinical evaluators to misunderstand the incompetency standard and to over-diagnose incompetency.2 3 3

Moreover, it would recognize that competency in the

criminal process is more a legal than a clinical question, involving
legal and normative judgements and not merely clinical ones. In addition, it would avoid a serious conflict of interest for counsel that can
undermine the attorney-client relationship and threaten the values
underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Finally, subsuming the bulk of competency determination in the attorney-client
relationship would avoid an unnecessary drain on scarce clinical time,
allowing a reallocation of clinical resources from evaluation to treatment. This reallocation can increase the quality of the incompetency
treatment process and limit delays, allowing defendants impaired by
mental illness to improve more rapidly and to obtain a more expeditious disposition of their criminal charges.
If implemented, these recommendations can transform the way
the law defines and evaluates competency in the criminal process, as
well as the way it deals with defendants whose abilities to assume the
role of criminal defendants are impaired by mental illness. Those
233 See supra notes 216 to 217 and accompanying text. -
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most seriously impaired would still be able to claim the protections of
the existing doctrine, although most would receive treatment continuances rather than a label of "incompetent." Those whose impairment
is marginal would be able either to obtain treatment, which they
themselves arrange and choose as a condition for receiving a brief
continuance, or to plead guilty or face their charges. Courts would
usually honor the choice of assenting to counsel's recommendations.
They would interfere with only those whose assent seems clearly to be
a product of mental illness. The result can be a restructured competency doctrine that fulfills its protective purposes in a way that is more
sensitive to individual autonomy, and that avoids many of the unnecessary costs and burdens of delay, stigma, and hospitalization that existing practices too often impose.

